No abstract

Autonomous driving has achieved significant progress in recent years, but autonomous cars are still unable to tackle high-risk situations where a potential accident is likely. In such near-accident scenarios, even a minor change in the vehicle's actions may result in drastically different consequences. To avoid unsafe actions in near-accident scenarios, we need to fully explore the environment. However, reinforcement learning (RL) and imitation learning (IL), two widely-used policy learning methods, cannot model rapid phase transitions and are not scalable to fully cover all the states. To address driving in near-accident scenarios, we propose a hierarchical reinforcement and imitation learning (H-REIL) approach that consists of low-level policies learned by IL for discrete driving modes, and a high-level policy learned by RL that switches between different driving modes. Our approach exploits the advantages of both IL and RL by integrating them into a unified learning framework. Experimental results and user studies suggest our approach can achieve higher efficiency and safety compared to other methods. Analyses of the policies demonstrate our high-level policy appropriately switches between different low-level policies in near-accident driving situations.

Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from converging to socially less desirable equilibria when multiple equilibria exist. Previous works address this challenge with explicit reward shaping, which requires the strong assumption that agents can be forced to be prosocial. We propose using a less restrictive peer-rewarding mechanism, gifting, that guides the agents toward more socially desirable equilibria while allowing agents to remain selfish and decentralized. Gifting allows each agent to give some of their reward to other agents. We employ a theoretical framework that captures the benefit of gifting in converging to the prosocial equilibrium by characterizing the equilibria's basins of attraction in a dynamical system. With gifting, we demonstrate increased convergence of high risk, general-sum coordination games to the prosocial equilibrium both via numerical analysis and experiments.

No abstract

Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from converging to socially less desirable equilibria when multiple equilibria exist. Previous works address this challenge with explicit reward shaping, which requires the strong assumption that agents can be forced to be prosocial. We propose using a less restrictive peer-rewarding mechanism, gifting, that guides the agents toward more socially desirable equilibria while allowing agents to remain selfish and decentralized. Gifting allows each agent to give some of their reward to other agents. We employ a theoretical framework that captures the benefit of gifting in converging to the prosocial equilibrium by characterizing the equilibria's basins of attraction in a dynamical system. With gifting, we demonstrate increased convergence of high risk, general-sum coordination games to the prosocial equilibrium both via numerical analysis and experiments.