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Preface and acknowledgements xi 1 Introduction 2 Notation, definitions, and two fundamental theorems 3 The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives 3.1 The method of majority decision 3.1.1 The case where the individual preferences are orderings 3.1.1.1 The method of majority decision is a social welfare function 3.1.1.2 The method of majority decision is a social decision function 3.1.1.3 The method of majority decision and order restricted preferences 3.1.2 The case where the individual preferences are quasi-transitive 3.1.2.1 The method of majority decision is a social welfare function for quasi-transitive individual preferences 3.1.2.2 The method of majority decision is a social decision function of type QT for quasi-transitive individual preferences 3.2 Alternative single-stage social decision rules 3.3 Multi-stage majority decision rules vii Contents viii 6.3 Possibility results for contractible preference spaces 6.4 Discrete vs. continuous and the choice of topology Concluding remarks

We present questionnaire studies concerning equity judgments based on an axiom that underlies Rawls's difference principle. Our investigation, spanning over a period of fifteen years, was run at German, Austrian and Slovenian universities. We also modified two of our basic scenarios to check for responsibility aspects. Additionally, we included information on socio-demographic characteristics of respondents in a probit model. Answers depend on cultural environments, but results indicate some convergence over time. Responsibility considerations are important if they can be attributed to particular persons. Although overall explanatory power of demographic attributes is low, we observe significant gender differences. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2007.

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