Cognitive gains are reported to be induced by acute aerobic exercise, but the role of fitness in the effect of acute aerobic exercise on executive function remains unknown. Therefore, we aimed to examine the effect of fitness on acute exercise-induced changes in executive function from neural mechanism approach. Twenty-four female college students were assigned to high-fitness or low-fitness groups based on their cardiovascular fitness level, and then underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing N-back tasks before and after 30 min of acute exercise. The behavioral results revealed significant interaction effects of group by time in the 0-back and 1-back tasks, but not in the 2-back task. The accuracy was significantly higher in the high-fitness group than in the low-fitness group before exercise in the 1-back and 2-back tasks. At the neural level, significant interaction effects of group by time were observed in all tasks. The 0-back and 1-back tasks activated the right cerebellum while the 2-back task activated subcortical regions. Our findings suggest that fitness moderates the effect of aerobic exercise on cognitive function, and provide the first neural evidence to support the influence of fitness on exercise-induced cognitive performance.

Traditionally, the self-serving bias has been investigated in ambiguous contexts in which participants work on tasks that measure novel abilities before making attributions without clear criteria for success or failure feedback. Prior studies have confirmed that the self-serving bias is pervasive in the general population, yet it varies significantly across situations involving ambiguous contexts. The present study features an unambiguous context encompassing interpersonal events that involved implicit causality (with the “self” as an actor or recipient), the inherent logic of which indicated attribution criteria. The aim of this study was to explore whether there is a self-serving bias in unambiguous contexts and to examine whether it is as sensitive to situation as it has been shown to be in ambiguous contexts. The results showed that, in an unambiguous context, participants exhibited self-serving bias in relation to attribution associated with negative interpersonal events. Additionally, the self-serving bias was greater in the actor condition relative to the recipient condition (Study 1), and this effect was not affected by the level of self-awareness, which was manipulated by the use or otherwise of a camera during the experiment (Study 2). Our findings provide evidence for the existence of the self-serving bias in unambiguous contexts. Moreover, the self-serving bias was shown to be immune to situation in unambiguous contexts, but it did depend on factors associated with the events per se, such as the actor versus recipient role that the self played in interpersonal events.

Although self–other behavioral differences in decision making under risk have been observed in some contexts, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying such differences. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the cups task, in which participants choose between risky and sure options for themselves and others in gain and loss situations, we found that people were more risk-taking when making decisions for themselves than for others in loss situations but were equally risk-averse in gain situations. Significantly stronger activations were observed in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior insula (AI) when making decisions for the self than for others in loss situations but not in gain situations. Furthermore, the activation in the dmPFC was stronger when people made sure choices for others than for themselves in gain situations but not when they made risky choices, and was both stronger when people made sure and risky choices for themselves than for others in loss situations. These findings suggest that gain–loss situation modulates self–other differences in decision making under risk, and people are highly likely to differentiate the self from others when making decisions in loss situations.

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Introdction Previous studies have argued that people tend to isolate themselves from negative information. This tendency is modulated by the individual's role in social interaction, that is, as an initiative actor (e.g., “I hit Tom”) or a passive recipient (e.g., “Paul hits me”). Depressed patients tend to focus on negative aspects of themselves and cope with situations passively. It is still an open question how the actor/recipient role affects the behavioral and neural responses to self in depression. Methods The present study adopted functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology to investigate behavioral and neural responses to self (as an actor/recipient) in depressed patients and the matched healthy controls when attributing negative events. Results Compared with healthy controls, depressed patients showed more self‐attribution for negative events. Depressed patients showed increased brain activity in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) subsystem of the default mode network (DMN) when they played recipient role in self‐related negative events. Activity of the dmPFC subsystem was negatively correlated with depressed patients’ self‐attribution for negative events in recipient condition. While decreased brain activity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem was observed in depressed patients when they played the actor or recipient role in self‐related negative events. Activity of the MTL subsystem was negatively correlated with depressed patients’ reaction time when they played recipient role in selfrelated negative events. Conclusion These results implicated that depressed patients manifested the negative self‐view. Actor/recipient role affected their activation patterns in the DMN which were different from the healthy controls. The correlation between the abnormal brain activations of the DMN and the behavioral performances might manifest more easily when depressed patients played recipient role in negative events.