Important changes have occurred in unsecured credit markets over the past three decades. Most prominently, there have been large increases in aggregate consumer debt, the personal bankruptcy rate, the size of bankruptcies, the dispersion of interest rates paid by borrowers, and the relative discount received by those with good credit ratings. We find that improvements in information available to lenders on household-level costs of bankruptcy can account for a significant fraction of what has been observed. The ex ante welfare gains from better information are positive but small. (JEL D14, D82, G21)

No abstract

In 2005, reforms made formal personal bankruptcy much more costly. Shortly after, the US began to experience its most severe recession in seventy years, and while personal bankruptcy rates rose, they rose only modestly given the severity of the rise in unemployment. By contrast, informal default through delinquency rose sharply. In the subsequent recovery, households have been widely viewed as "deleveraging" (Mian and Sufi, 2010; Eggertson and Krugman, 2012) via the largest reduction of unsecured debt seen in the past three decades. We measure the relative roles of recent bankruptcy reform and labor market risk in accounting for consumer debt and default over the Great Recession. Our results suggest that bankruptcy reform likely prevented a substantial increase in formal bankruptcy filings, but had only limited effect on informal default from delinquencies, and that changes in job-finding rates were central to both.

This paper documents and interprets a fact central to the dynamics of informal consumer debt default: delinquency does not mean a persistent cessation of payment. In particular, we observe that for individuals 60 to 90 days late on payments, (i) 85% make payments during the next quarter to avoid getting into severe delinquency, and (ii) 40% reduce their debt (either because they made payments or received debt forgiveness). To understand these facts, we develop a theoretically and institutionally plausible model of debt delinquency and bankruptcy. Our model reproduces the dynamics of delinquency and suggests an interpretation of the data in which lenders frequently (in roughly 40% of cases) reset loan terms for delinquent borrowers, typically offering partial debt forgiveness, rather than a blanket imposition of the "penalty rates" most unsecured credit contracts specify.

, and Xin Tang IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.