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Chemical safety is related to public health, safety and environmental concerns, and the dangerous chemicals safety problem is becoming the one that people commonly pay attention to. Strengthening chemical safety supervision not only involves safe production, but also is an important link to maintain social safety. Most related studies focus on chemical safety under normal regulation, this paper addresses the perspective of ‘special rectification’ and ‘normal regulation’, and establishes an evolutionary game model between chemical enterprises and government supervision departments under different supervision modes. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper studies the evolution process of the two game players' strategy choices, and compares and analyzes the evolution, stability and equilibrium between the chemical safety and the behavior strategies of government regulatory departments. The model is effectively analyzed based on numerical simulation, and the results show that: Under the ‘special rectification’ mode, the strategic choice of chemical enterprises engaging in safety without investment depends on the difference between the benefits and costs of safety without investment; In the ‘normal regulation’ mode, the choice of its safety non-investment strategy depends on the difference between the cost of engaging in safety investment and the cost of safety non-investment; Increasing the government's punishment will encourage chemical enterprises to take safety investment behavior under the two supervision modes. Increasing the punishment has a significant impact on the safety investment behavior of chemical enterprises under the ‘normal regulation’ mode, but it has no significant impact on the behavior of chemical enterprises under the ‘special rectification’ mode. At the same time, increasing the punishment will inhibit the strict supervision behavior of the government. The research conclusion provides important decision support for government departments to effectively supervise the safety production of chemical enterprises.

With the global outbreak of COVID-19, the panic-buying incidents triggered by the variants of the Omicron strain have severely affected the normal social order. This paper considers the complex interest game and interactive relationship among multiple subjects in the mass-panic buying event caused by rumors and constructs a three-party evolution game model of local government, rumor-monger, and public. The strategy-selection process of each subject based on evolutionary game theory is studied, and the strategy selection of three game subjects in different situations and related influencing factors are analyzed. Taking the example of the montmorillonite powder panic buying caused by the XBB virus strain rumor in China, the evolutionary game model constructed in this study is simulated and analyzed. The study shows that the evolutionary process of the mass panic-buying event is characterized by six stages: the initial stage; the outbreak stage; the spread stage; the climax stage; the relief stage; and the recovery stage. There are four stable points in the evolutionary game of the three game subjects, namely (no intervention, no rumor, no panic buying), (no intervention, rumor, no panic buying), (intervention, no rumor, no panic buying), and (intervention, rumor, no panic buying). The strategy of government intervention will be adjusted according to the strategy selection of the public and the rumor-monger. Under the mechanism of reward and punishment of the higher-level government, increasing the punishment and reward intensity of the higher-level government will promote the local government to intervene in the rumor-mongering event faster, but increasing the reward intensity has a more significant impact on the intervention behavior of the local government than punishment, and increasing punishment intensity has a more significant impact on the non-rumor-mongering behavior of the rumor-monger than reward. The parameters of social risk-bearing cost, risk transmission coefficient, rumor-mongering income and cost, and public drug purchase cost have different degrees of influence on the evolutionary behavior of game subjects. Therefore, this study provides new ideas for effectively responding to mass panic buying events in the context of public emergencies.

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