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Prefix hijacking, a misbehavior in which a misconfigured or malicious BGP router originates an IP prefix that the router does not own, is becoming an increasingly serious security problem on the Internet. In this paper, we conduct a first comprehensive study on incrementally deployable mitigation solutions against prefix hijacking. We first propose a novel reactive detection-assisted solution based on the idea of bogus route purging and valid route promotion. Our simulations based on realistic settings show that purging bogus routes at 20 highest-degree ASes reduces the polluted portion of the Internet by a random prefix hijack from 50% down to 24%, and adding promotion further reduces the remaining pollution by 33% ∼ 57%, We prove that our proposed route purging and promotion scheme preserve the convergence properties of BGP regardless of the number of promoters. We are the first to demonstrate that detection systems based on a limited number of BGP feeds are subject to detection evasion by hijackers. Motivated the need for proactive defenses to complement reactive mitigation response, we evaluate customer route filtering, a best common practice among large ISPs today, and show its limited effectiveness. We also show the added benefits of combining route purging-promotion with customer route filtering.

Due to the vulnerability of civilian global positioning system (GPS) signals, the accuracy of phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be greatly compromised by GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs), which introduce phase shifts into true phase angle measurements. Focusing on simultaneous GSAs for multiple PMU locations, this paper proposes a novel identification and correction algorithm in distribution systems. A sensitivity analysis of state estimation residuals on a single GSA phase angle is firstly implemented. An identification algorithm using a probing technique is proposed to determine the locations of spoofed PMUs and the ranges of GSA phase shifts. Based on the identification results, these GSA phase shifts are determined via an estimation algorithm that minimizes the mismatch between measurements and system states. Further, with the attacked PMU data corrected, the system states are recovered. Simulations in unbalanced IEEE 34-bus and 123-bus distribution systems demonstrates the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method.Index Terms-State estimation, phasor measurement units, multiple GPS spoofing attacks, unbalanced distribution systems, attack identification and correction.

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