In recent years scholarly attention has shifted from the study of democratization to the phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism. In these regimes, regular elections are held for national legislatures and chief executives, yet they fail to live up to democratic standards of freedom and fairness. A range of new research has investigated these regimes and especially the capacity of elections to either dislodge or reinvigorate authoritarian incumbents. This article reviews some of the current work on electoral authoritarianism and attempts to find ways to achieve synthesis and better theoretical development. It notes the need for greater conceptual consensus, attention to context, and better evaluation of what electoral competiveness means under authoritarian conditions. It argues that the next stage for research should be smaller and contextual comparison that can allow for greater attention to concepts, while allowing for strong midrange theory.

Recently researchers have built on field experiences from novel and challenging settings to develop new insights into elite interviewing strategies, and specifically the question of access. One such context that has been underexplored is the weaker institutional environment found in much of the developing world. Many of the common suggestions regarding access emphasize an elite’s relative insularity and unwillingness to participate in research due to issues of status and prestige. By contrast, in weaker institutional settings many elites are protected by fewer organizational safeguards, are more accustomed to in-person conversations, and are often quite willing to participate in research. The challenge is rather identifying elites to begin with, working around flexible scheduling norms, and adapting to a much more direct and persistent form of communication with elites. Drawing on insights derived mainly from fieldwork in Africa, this article identifies some best practices on how to prepare for elite interviews, organize logistically, and develop contacts once on-site.

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State capacity is arguably an essential factor that stabilizes electoral authoritarian rule. Yet, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa many measures of state capacity are generally weak. What therefore explains the persistence of electoral authoritarianism in Africa? This study provides a comparison of Tanzania and Cameroon to highlight two divergent reactions to the problem of power consolidation in Africa. In Cameroon, a centralized presidency and comparatively large coercive apparatus underpinned a strong patrimonial state. By contrast, in Tanzania the ruling party became an institution that integrated elites and appeared to subsume the state. These regime configurations stabilized electoral authoritarianism in unique ways, and led to different dependence on the state during elections. The study sheds new light on contemporary Africa, and the diverse sources of authoritarian resilience in the face of multiparty elections.

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