Bargaining is a tool to share collaborative gains and to facilitate reaching agreement. To improve incentives to join an international climate agreement (ICA), the Nash bargaining solution can be used to distribute cooperative gains across signatories. In this paper, we examine how the formation of ICAs and their mitigation efficiency are impacted by the use of the Nash bargaining solution. In a Nash bargaining game with heterogeneous players, bargaining powers are unequal and may be driven by different characteristics of the players. We employ different sets of asymmetric bargaining weights in order to examine the effectiveness of climate coalitions that emerge as stable agreements. Using the Nash bargaining solution, we obtain results from the stability of coalition model (STACO). We find that the Nash bargaining solution can improve the participation incentives and performances of ICAs as compared to agreements that do not redistribute gains from cooperation, but its capacity to overcome free-riding incentives is limited. However, if Nash bargaining accounts for outside options of players, we find larger stable coalitions and higher global abatement levels. In fact, Nash bargaining with outside options can stabilise the largest coalitions that can possibly be stable in our game.

Pollution-intensive industries (PIIs) have both scale effect and environmental sensitivity. Therefore, this paper studies how environmental regulation (ER) affects the location dynamics of PIIs under the agglomeration effect. Our results show that, ER can increase the production costs of pollution-intensive firms (PIFs) by internalizing the negative impact of pollutant discharge in a region, and thus, directly reduces the region’s attractiveness to PIFs. Meanwhile, ER can indirectly reduce the attractiveness of a region to PIFs by reducing the externality of the regional agglomeration effect. Moreover, these influences are regulated by the level of local economic development. Based on the moderated mediating effect model, we find evidence from the site selection activities of newly built chemical firms in cities across China. The empirical test shows that compared with 2014, the proportion of the direct effect of ER to the total effects significantly decreased in 2018, while the proportion of indirect effects under the agglomeration effect increased significantly. Our findings provide reference for the government to design effective environmental policies to guide the location choice of new PIFs.

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