PurposeConsidering the network externalities of online selling, this paper builds three different online direct selling models: manufacturer direct selling (MN model), network platform direct selling (NN model) and retailer direct selling (RN model). The optimal advertising and pricing decision and corporate profits under each selling model are investigated.Design/methodology/approachCombining the characteristics of online direct selling, this paper formulates direct selling models that are dominated by different companies as Stackelberg game models. Numerical analyses are carried out, along with the comparison of the equilibrium solutions for each model.FindingsThe authors' research shows that increasing network externalities is conducive to the development of enterprises. The network platform's profit is the lowest in the RN model and the highest in the NN one. The comparison of manufacturers' profits between the MN model and the NN model primarily depends on consumers' sensitivities for sales price and advertising promotion level. The manufacturer does not benefit from the RN model due to the lowest efficiency.Originality/valueCoupled with three different online direct selling models and detailed analyses of the optimal solutions, this study has enriched the theoretical foundation of online direct selling. Moreover, this study extends the research of network externalities to the field of e-commerce, revealing the network externalities' influence on the decision-making of the e-supply chain.

With the popularization of platform economics, many manufacturers are shifting their operations from offline to online, forming platform supply chains (PSCs), which combine e-commerce with supply chain management. To study the influences of network externalities and fairness concerns on advertising strategies of the platform supply chain (PSC), we construct decentralized decision-making models, with and without fairness concerns. Then, we solve the optimal decisions regarding PSC and use numerical examples to verify the conclusions of the decision models. We further analyze the internal influences of advertising strategies on network externalities in the extended model. We find that the network externalities are beneficial to the PSC system, but the manufacturer’s fairness concerns are not beneficial to the PSC. The advertising strategies of the network platform are not affected by network externalities and fairness concerns. In the extended model, the manufacturer can obtain more profits, but the network platform yields less profit than the decentralized model without fairness concerns. Moreover, the more sensitive the network externalities are to the change in advertising strategies, the greater the profits for the PSC members.

To investigate how legal constraints on the recycling rate of used products and carbon trading mechanisms affect the profits and other decisions of supply chain system members, this paper develops and solves a two-cycle game model in which the manufacturer dominates while the retailer takes a secondary position; the manufacturer produces only non-low-carbon new products in the first cycle and both new and low-carbon remanufactured products in the second cycle. Simultaneously, the effects of parameters such as recovery rate, unit carbon trading price, and carbon emission reduction factor on the decision making of members of the supply chain system are also discussed. Finally, the conclusions are verified by numerical analysis: (1) When carbon reduction is low, the manufacturer will choose the highest recycling rate to obtain the highest profit, and when carbon reduction is high, manufacturers tend to choose not to recycle when the minimum recycling rate bound by law harms the interests of manufacturers. (2) Under the implementation of the carbon trading mechanism, the unit carbon trading price affects the profits of the members of the supply chain system depending on the size of the carbon emission reduction, and the two are negatively correlated at lower carbon emission reductions and positively correlated at higher carbon emission reductions. (3) From the perspective of supply chain system members’ interests, legal constraints and the existence of carbon trading mechanisms are not always conducive to increasing the margins of members of the supply chain system, both relevant to the size of carbon emission reductions. (4) From the perspective of environmental benefits, supply chain members do not need to pay economic costs in all cases to contribute to environmental benefits, and the existence of minimum recycling rate constraints and carbon trading mechanisms are conducive to achieving carbon reduction targets.

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