The paper proposes a game-theoretic model of interaction between investors and innovators, taking into account the existence of so-called "fake" innovators offering knowingly unprofitable projects. The model is a Bayesian non-cooperative, repetitive game with recalculated payments and partly unobservable ex interim player types. It allows quantifying the parameters of the strategy for all player types to find equilibrium solutions. The model describes rational modes for screening "fake" innovators based on adjusting players' probabilistic estimates.

The modern development of the Russian economy is characterized by conditions of socio-ecological and economic development, which create the preconditions for the formation of such a system of using natural resources in the processes of industrial production and consumption, which will be distinguished by rationality, ensure not only environmental, but also economic security of society, the well-being of the present and future generations of the population, assume the creation of necessary and sufficient conditions for sustainable development, which, in turn, will require the introduction of not only economic, technical, technological, social and other transformations, but also changes in the mechanisms of state control and regulation of investment processes of environmental orientation. In our opinion, the greatest improvement should be subject to the regulatory and legal mechanism of both state regulation and, in particular, local public self-government. This need is explained by the fact that in the territories of municipalities, there are sources of environmental pollution and industrial enterprises implementing eco-efficient investment projects. However, as the analysis of the regulatory framework has shown, almost all documents regulating the activities of municipal government bodies in the investment and environmental spheres are approved by laws and resolutions of the governments of the regions in which the municipalities are located. Hence, it can be concluded that the improvement of the regulatory mechanism of state and public regulation should be carried out in a comprehensive manner for both the regional and municipal levels of government.

We study the effects of institutional information disclosure on the market equilibrium in a local market with knowledge asymmetry and scarce information. The purpose of our work is the analysis of long-term efficiency of a dedicated institutional mechanism of information disclosure for such a market. The paper presents the game-theoretic model of a local property rights market with an infrastructural institution disclosing non-personalized information in a system with a combination of market elements, administrative and shadow economy. For each object, there is some hidden non-transferrable information essential for assessment. Under such conditions, the influence of subjective biases on the market equilibrium can be described as a Bayesian probability model of adverse selection. In the elaborated model, the equilibrium parameters are theoretically analyzed. It is shown that information asymmetry in the modeled systems leads to an irrational allocation of investment resources. It is shown that the infrastructural institutions disclosing non-personalized information are not only unable to efficiently counteract adverse selection, but facilitate it.