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This paper empirically tests the impact of the succession of family businesses on corporate innovation investments and examines the two different types of political resources, political connection and state ownership, in the moderating role of the relationship between succession and enterprise innovation investments. The results show succession hinders the innovation investment of family firms, and political connection has a negative moderating effect on the relationship, while state ownership has a positive moderating effect. Further research shows that in areas with poor institutional environment, the negative adjustment effect of political connections is more significant, and in areas with better institutional environment, the positive adjustment effect of state ownership is more significant.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether substantial differences in institutional environment in China lead to different levels of demand for political connection. Design/methodology/approach – Using a data set of 296 listed private sector enterprises (PSEs) in China, the authors empirically investigate the effects of institutional environmental factors upon political connection. Findings – The authors find that the lower the level of regional property right protection, the more powerful the government intervention, and the slower the economic development, the more motivated the PSEs were to build relationship with the government via partial state ownership. However, the degree of local corruption was not correlated with the demand for political connection. The authors also find that partial state ownership in PSEs exerted a positive effect on performance. Originality/value – Deviating from previous literature that has been mostly concerned about the economic consequences to firms caused by political connections, this paper examines the reasons for political connection among Chinese PSEs. The authors introduce a new dimension of political connection, namely, partial state ownership in PSEs.

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