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Cross-border transactions have been more and more popular around the world. However, the current cross-border transactions still have risks and challenges, e.g., differences in regulation policies and unbalanced profits of banks. To address this critical issue, we construct a new framework for the transaction system with the support of blockchain technology. In this paper, we propose a new consortium blockchain system, namely asymmetric consortium blockchain (ACB), to ensure the implementation of cross-border transactions. Different from traditional consortium blockchain, the new blockchain system could support the supernode to regulate all the transactions timely. Furthermore, the new smart contract is designed to lower the opportunity loss for each node and make the profits allocation system fairer. In the end, the numerical experiments were carried out based on the transactions of Shenzhen and Hong Kong. The results show that the proposed ACB system is efficient to make the profit allocation fairer for the participants and keep intelligent for the new cross-border transaction system.

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In recent years, low-carbon development, and the change in military technology in relation to energy change have necessitated new energy innovation. Moreover, low-carbon development and civilmilitary integration (CMI) aim to improve economic sustainability. Thus, undertaking new energy innovation under the CMI approach is an efficient way to achieve energy technology innovation and economic sustainable development. However, there is inefficient cooperation between civilian enterprises (CEs) and military enterprises (MEs) due to inadequate government regulations regarding CMI. Considering the instability of this embryonic industry, evolutionary game theory (EGT) could be effective for analyzing the strategies of the local government (LG), CEs, and MEs in the Chinese new energy CMI industry. Thus, this study built a tripartite-agent evolutionary model to analyze the impact of LG regulation on enterprise cooperation. The results suggest that, 1) the punishment mechanism is an essential regulation tool; 2) the LG's correlation return from enterprises' cooperation influences the level of the encouragement it provides; 3) if penalty mechanism fails, increasing the support above the medium degree to CEs and decreasing the ratio of MEs' excess earnings from cooperation to below the medium degree could support enterprises achieve cooperation. This study supplements the inadequate research on joint innovation on military and civilian energy issues. Moreover, the research results could provide references for real-world practice. INDEX TERMS Civil-military integration, multi-agent evolutionary game theory, new energy technology innovation, cooperation. HANBO LIU is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree with the

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