This paper deals with issues concerning green subsidies of government and optimal decisions of a manufacture and dual-channel retailers in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. Both a decentralized supply chain and a centralized supply chain are considered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for guaranteeing that the two supply chains run normally under government subsidies are proposed. For the decentralized supply chain, a three-layer model is constructed according to different priorities of the four participants. Both Bertrand game and Stackelberg game are involved. For the centralized supply chain, a two-layer model is given. Decision models of the government under a financial budget are developed for maximizing the green degree of each case. It is shown that the green degree of the product of the centralized supply chain is always higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. Meanwhile, the total profit of the centralized supply is also higher. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models and make some supplements.

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This paper considers a two-level supply chain involving a supplier and a retailer. The retailer sells perishable products to consumers over a finite time horizon, and the demand is driven by a price-and-utility function. First, we study the noncooperative problem, which is formulated by a Stackelberg model. It is shown that the optimal pricing strategy of the retailer is to reduce a constant amount on the price at the beginning of each stage. Second, we examine the cooperative problem, in which the supplier and the retailer jointly price the product. Maximum selling cycle lengths of the two situations are obtained by analyzing the reasonability of the sales price. We demonstrate that the selling cycle length is extended by cooperation. Moreover, we show that they lower the sales price in the cooperative case so as to maximize the total profit. Meanwhile, an allocation method is provided based on the proportion.

This paper studies ordering and pricing issues under multiple times ordering. A manufacturer and a retailer are involved in our discussion. The definition of a reasonable price is given based on the practical requirement. First, we construct a Stackelberg model in which the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions respectively. During the process of derivation, both ordering time-points and optimal prices are expressed as functions of number of times of ordering. By solving a quadratic programming model with an undetermined parameter, we demonstrate that the optimal ordering timepoints of the retailer are equidistant time points on the given selling period. Second, a cooperative model is developed in which the manufacturer and the retailer jointly make decisions. It is shown that the optimal retail price is lower and the number of times of ordering is more in the cooperative situation than the noncooperative one. Further, an allocation method based on revenue proportions is proposed.

With the raise of consumers' environmental awareness, automobile manufacturers try to add production lines of new energy vehicles. This paper deals with pricing and investment decision issues of an automobile manufacturer for different types of cars. The consumers' purchase preference for the new energy vehicle is formulated as a function of the manufacturer's investment on facility and advertisement. Aiming to maximize the total profit of the manufacturer, we construct a decision model. By solving a differential equation, a necessary condition is proposed for guaranteeing that the manufacturer produces and sells both of the two types of vehicles. It is shown that both the consumers' preference and the carbon tax affect the decisions of the manufacturer. For the possible scenarios in which the manufacturer only sells one kind of product, we present two simplified models. By comparing different achieved solutions, the optimal decision strategy is achieved. Finally, we show a numerical illustration to examine different decisions of the manufacturer under different sensitivity coefficients with regard to the investment. The main contribution of this paper is providing a jointly pricing and investment decision model under changeable consumers' purchase preference, and revealing the influence factors of the automobile manufacturer's transformation.