The effectiveness of contracts is bounded by the institutional environment in which they are designed and enforced. When firms form supply chain partnerships in emerging markets, they may experience contract ineffectiveness, which is defined as a firm's perceived limits of contracts with respect to safeguarding interests and coordinating activities. Specifically, we identify two institutional factors that may give rise to contract ineffectiveness, information transparency and legal enforceability, as they determine how effectively a firm designs and enforces a contract. In addition, we reveal that contract ineffectiveness prompts a firm to seek social ties, including business ties and political ties, to overcome the institutionally induced limits of contracts. These efforts, however, are moderated by the type of predominant pressure a firm bears. While equity pressure strengthens the relationship between contract ineffectiveness and a firm's pursuit of social ties, efficiency pressure weakens this relationship, because seeking social ties imposes an extra burden of efficiency. Tested by data collected from 187 distributors in China, our study reveals the institutional causes and the consequences of contract ineffectiveness, which is a common problem encountered by firms when forming supply chain partnerships in emerging markets.

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To improve our understanding of the bright side and the dark side of political ties and determine the processes linking political ties to firm performance in emerging markets, we investigate the underlying mechanism of political ties' effects from the perspective of dynamic capability theory and institutional theory. We posit that reduced marketfocused innovation capability and strengthened legitimacy mediate the effect of political ties on firm performance. In addition, to capture the nature of the relationship between political ties and performance, we adopt a contingency perspective in our examination of the moderating roles of legal enforceability and competitive intensity. Specifically, we suggest that legal enforceability buffers the negative impact of political ties on marketfocused innovation capability but mitigates the positive impact of political ties on firm legitimacy. Moreover, competitive intensity enhances the positive impact of marketfocused innovation capability and firm legitimacy on firm performance. We test our hypotheses using a survey with 362 respondents in China. In conclusion, our findings provide important insights into how Chinese firms effectively utilize political ties to improve their performance.