The three-party evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and institutions of higher learning is established, and the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior is discussed under the two strategies of “incentive” and “non-incentive” chosen by the government. The results show that under the premise of stronger innovation consciousness of the government and institutions and smaller the innovation cost of enterprises, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. The incentive degree of government should be controlled within a reasonable range to prevent enterprises from falling into a bad state because of the temptation of economic interests.

A “virtual enterprise” is an effective organization formed by enterprises and partners under market opportunity which can flexibly adapt to the dynamic market demand and improve the competitiveness of enterprises. To select virtual enterprise partners objectively and scientifically, this study proposes the evaluation model of the innovation resource capability of the alternative enterprises under the unknown weight. In the multigranularity hesitation fuzzy language environment, the unknown weight is solved by using fuzzy entropy theory. The risk attitude of decision-making enterprises is introduced by using the improved prospect theory and the selection of partners is comprehensively considered. Finally, a case study is presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The research intends to enable the virtual enterprise to choose the partners swiftly such that they can compensate for the shortcomings and optimize the allocation of innovation resources.

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