In this study, a series of resonant-column experiments were conducted on marine clays from Bohai Bay and Hangzhou Bay, China. The characteristics of the dynamic shear modulus (G) and damping ratio (D) of these marine clays were examined. It was found that G and D not only vary with shear strain (γ), but they also have a strong connection with soil depth (H) (reflected by the mean effective confining pressure (σm) in the laboratory test conditions). With increasing H (σm) and fixed γ, the value of G gradually increases; conversely, the value of D gradually decreases, and this is accompanied by the weakening of the decay or growth rate. An intelligent model based on a back-propagation neural network (BPNN) was developed for the calculation of these parameters. Compared with existing function models, the proposed intelligent model avoids the forward propagation of data errors and the need for human intervention regarding the fitting parameters. The model can accurately predict the G and D characteristics of marine clays at different H (σm) and the corresponding γ. The prediction accuracy is universal and does not strictly depend on the number of neurons in the hidden layer of the neural network.

This paper considers online convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their own cost functions using locally available feedback. A common assumption in the study of such games is that the agents are symmetric, meaning that they have access to the same type of information or feedback. Here we lift this assumption, which is often violated in practice, and instead consider asymmetric agents; specifically, we assume some agents have access to first-order gradient feedback and others have access to the zeroth-order oracles (cost function evaluations). We propose an asymmetric feedback learning algorithm that combines the agent feedback mechanisms. We analyze the regret and Nash equilibrium convergence of this algorithm for convex games and strongly monotone games, respectively. Specifically, we show that our algorithm always performs between pure first-order and zeroth-order methods, and can match the performance of these two extremes by adjusting the number of agents with access to zeroth-order oracles. Therefore, our algorithm incorporates the pure first-order and zeroth-order methods as special cases. We provide numerical experiments on an online market problem for both deterministic and risk-averse games to demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithm.