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Central Asian states are usually considered as passive elements rather than active agents of integration in Greater Eurasia. This article considers the role of these states as active agents shaping integration processes according to their own interests and perspectives. All Central Asian states conduct so-called “multivector” foreign policies balancing relations with the key great powers (Russia, China, and “collective West”) as well as with Middle Eastern and South Asian nations. From their point of view, the ideal formula for Greater Eurasia should include the entire continent. However, the current geopolitical situation in the world turns integration of Central Asian nations with Russia and China into the only available option. Political and military integration with Russia within the CSTO as well as economic integration with Russia within the Eurasian Economic Union are key elements of this. The SCO is also very important as the key structure shaping regional security system. The general framework for the construction of Greater Eurasia including Russia, China, and Central Asian nations in the economic sphere is mostly connected to the Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative and to the agreement on cooperation between this initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union. However, between Central Asian nations, on one hand, and Moscow and Beijing, on the other hand, there are still many practical issues that must be solved to push integration forward, and currently there are no indicators that these issues would be solved in the near future.

Moscow came late to the soft power game, but made it an integral feature of the drive to restore Russia's great power status. Russia has a proud cultural legacy and has invested heavily in trying to promote a positive image of the country abroad, for example through the Russia Today television channel. However, the leadership faced the challenge of dealing with the complex legacy of the Soviet past, and finding a viable development model for Russia: it is hard for a country facing economic stagnation to project a positive international image. Russia's authoritarian turn since 2004, and its use of force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, have reinforced negative stereotypes of Russia as a hard power. For these reasons Russian leaders have largely failed to develop soft power as an effective policy tool.

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This paper analyzes why formation of policy networks, which is an effective tool of European policy in different spheres, have lost significant part of its positive functions from the point of view of guaranteeing European energy security in case of European–Russian gas policy networks. This can be explained by the absence of effective international regime in gas trade as well as by failed transition to democracy, market economy and rule of law in Russia. As a result of this, German, Italian and French leaders involved into European–Russian gas policy networks face serious moral, legal and political dilemmas.