Central Asian states are usually considered as passive elements rather than active agents of integration in Greater Eurasia. This article considers the role of these states as active agents shaping integration processes according to their own interests and perspectives. All Central Asian states conduct so-called “multivector” foreign policies balancing relations with the key great powers (Russia, China, and “collective West”) as well as with Middle Eastern and South Asian nations. From their point of view, the ideal formula for Greater Eurasia should include the entire continent. However, the current geopolitical situation in the world turns integration of Central Asian nations with Russia and China into the only available option. Political and military integration with Russia within the CSTO as well as economic integration with Russia within the Eurasian Economic Union are key elements of this. The SCO is also very important as the key structure shaping regional security system. The general framework for the construction of Greater Eurasia including Russia, China, and Central Asian nations in the economic sphere is mostly connected to the Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative and to the agreement on cooperation between this initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union. However, between Central Asian nations, on one hand, and Moscow and Beijing, on the other hand, there are still many practical issues that must be solved to push integration forward, and currently there are no indicators that these issues would be solved in the near future.

The article analyzes the evolution of Russia’s policy in secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space in 1991–2018. The authors differentiate the patterns of Russian policy between the “first” and “second” generation of frozen conflicts. The “first generation” includes four conflicts of an ethno-linguistic nature that arose out of the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Pridnestrov’e and Karabakh). Most commentators interpret Russia’s actions in the “second generation” conflicts as centralized, directly controlled by the president of Russia, and driven by Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion, and some extend this logic back to the conflicts of the 1990s. However, this article argues that this was not true of Russian policy for the “first generation” conflicts in the early 1990s. In that period the policies of the Yeltsin administration were a product of struggle of different forces both in Moscow and outside of it. The “first generation” conflicts all primarily originated as a result of local grievances. Gradually, shifts in the broader geopolitical landscape in Eurasia, especially the growing confrontation between Russia and the West, led to a reconfiguration of the logic of these conflicts, turning them into the elements of Russian-Western geopolitical opposition.

When various pyrrolo[3,2,1-ij]quinoline-1,2-diones were oxidized with m-chloroperbenzoic acid, 1,3oxazino [5,4,3-ij]quinolin-1,3-diones were obtained in good yields (64-86%) and characterized by spectral methods. Recyclization/rearrangement of the pyrroldione fragment of pyrrolo[3,2,1-ij]quinoline-1,2-diones, regardless of the presence and electronic nature of the substituent in the aromatic part, the presence of a bulky phenyl group or a multiple bond in the heterocyclic fragment, proceeds selectively with the formation of a 1,3oxazine cycle, rather than an isomeric 1,4-oxazine ring. This outcome corresponds to the data acquired from quantum mechanical calculations.

The article challenges the view that Russia’s goal in the post-Soviet space is to make the region an exclusive zone of Russian influence and keep other world powers out entirely. In fact, Russia has two policies towards the influence of other powers that are active in the region: a ‘business as usual’ approach, applied to China and Turkey; and a securitized ‘New Cold War policy’, applied to the US and West (especially towards their presence in Ukraine). Growing Chinese and Turkish influence has not been ‘securitized’, although the presence of both powers creates clear obstacles to the reintegration of former Soviet countries around Russia. The article draws on three bodies of literature (Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism) to explain this variation. While Moscow perceives growing Western influence in Ukraine as a threat to its domestic regime and identity as a great power and regional leader, it finds common ground with Beijing and Ankara in its concerns about the Western liberal democracy promotion agenda and views both powers as potential allies in the construction of a ‘multipolar world’.

Проведены синтез, докинг и исследование новых ингибиторов фактора Ха в ряду продуктов конденсаций по β-карбонильной группе замещенных пирроло[3,2,1-ij]хинолин-1,2-дионов с роданином, ариламинами и H-триптамином. Найдены перспективные ингибиторы фактора Ха с константами ингибирования, лежащими в микромолярном диапазоне концентраций (IC50 = 0,7 – 40 мкМ).