Abstract. This is the first paper in Russian historiography dedicated to the struggle of left and right groups in the Turkish army on the eve of a military coup on March 12, 1971. By 1970, an alliance of leftist intellectuals and officers was formed, led by the editor of the Devrim newspaper, Dogan Avjioglu and one of the organizers of the 1960 coup, a retired lieutenant general Jemal Madanoglu, received the conditional name of the organization of national revolutionaries. The members of the organization sought to approve the socialist system of the bassist type in the country and outlined the number of military coups March 9, 1971. However, the death of one and the opportunist position of two other leaders of the military wing led to the failure of the attempt of a leftist coup. On the contrary, on March 12, 1971, a right-wing military coup took place in Turkey. In the course of subsequent repressions, a powerful blow was dealt to the left groups in the army and in Turkish society as a whole. In an effort to end the repression and achieve consensus in society, moderately leftist forces led by B. Ejevit entered into a coalition with their opponents religious conservatives led by N. Erbakan.

In the 1950s, the Democratic Party came to power in Turkey, relying on the provincial bourgeoisie and clericals. The charismatic leader of democrats Adnan Menderes became the prime-minister. The Democratic government pursued an active foreign and domestic policy. In particular, abandoning its traditional neutrality, Turkey joined NATO and CenTO military blocs. Concessions were made to religious circles. The government also carried out large-scale reforms, for which the society was not ready, due to which an economic crisis erupted in the country, the most characteristic manifestation of which was high inflation. By introducing repressive laws against dissidents, attempts to isolate the opposition, in particular the leaders of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), the Democrats pushed the latter to search for allies in the army. In the ranks of the latter, under the influence of Western agents and the dissatisfaction of the officers themselves with the situation in the country, the idea of a military coup came about on May 27, 1960. As a result of the coup, the National Unity Committee came to power, consisting of representatives of the generals and leaders of the Republican Peoples Party. In 1961, a new constitution was adopted at a referendum, reforming the system of legislative power in the country, after which power again passed to civilian political institutions. The leader of the military who carried out the coup, General Jemal Grsel, became the prime minister, while the chairman of the Republican Peoples Party Ismet İnnbecame became the president of Turkey.

The paper examines the confrontation between the army, which supported the inviolability of the principles of a secular state, and the supporters of the Islamic way of development. The authors provide a short course on the history of the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980. Based on the analysis of actions and public statements of the event participants themselves, researchers come to a conclusion that the fight against clerical tendencies played a role in the preparation of military coups no less than the fight against left radicals. The 1970s in the history of Turkey is an extremely unstable political period when weak coalition governments were in power. Aggravated by the end of the 1970s party contradictions gave the military a pretext for another coup, which led to the fall of the Second and the formation of the Third Republic in the political history of Turkey. By the end of the 20th century Islamic proponents, having accumulated vast experience of confrontation with the army elite, had developed a new political strategy, becoming the locomotive of the struggle for democratic changes, which allowed them to win elections in 1996 and then in 2002. Having finally taken power in the country, the Islamic Justice and Development Party began largescale reforms of the army, which are still ongoing.

In the 1970s, Turkey was in a state of political turbulence. Weak coalition governments changed frequently and could not bring order to the country. The city streets turned into an arena of battles for various armed radical groups of nationalist, communist, Islamist and separatist persuasions. For 9 years from 1971 to 1980, 10 governments changed in Turkey. The political crisis was accompanied by an economic downturn, expressed in hyperinflation and an increase in external debt. Chaos and anarchy caused discontent among Turkish financial circles and generals with the situation in the country and led to the idea of a military coup, already the third in the republican history of Turkey. The US State Department was extremely concerned about the situation in Turkey, hoping to find a reliable cover against further exports of communism and Islamism to the Middle East, approving the possibility of a coup. The coup was led by the chief of the General Staff K. Evren. Political events of the second half of the 1970s allow us to conclude that, despite the interest of the financial and military circles of the United States in it, the military coup on September 12, 1980 had mainly domestic political reasons.