Famine Early Warning and Response 1995
DOI: 10.3362/9781780444925.001
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1. The Missing Link

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Cited by 4 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…As mentioned in the previous section, by the end of the 1990s, many people in sub-Saharan Africa found themselves facing a protracted crisis. Early warning had rarely led to early response, and targeting strategies rarely reached the most vulnerable (see, for example, Buchanan-Smith and Davies, 1995; Jaspars and Shoham, 1999). Aid workers had to show ever higher levels of malnutrition to get a response, reflecting what Bradbury has called the ‘normalisation of crisis’ (Bradbury, 1998).…”
Section: Creating a Fantasy: The Function And Dangers Of Regimes Of Untruthsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As mentioned in the previous section, by the end of the 1990s, many people in sub-Saharan Africa found themselves facing a protracted crisis. Early warning had rarely led to early response, and targeting strategies rarely reached the most vulnerable (see, for example, Buchanan-Smith and Davies, 1995; Jaspars and Shoham, 1999). Aid workers had to show ever higher levels of malnutrition to get a response, reflecting what Bradbury has called the ‘normalisation of crisis’ (Bradbury, 1998).…”
Section: Creating a Fantasy: The Function And Dangers Of Regimes Of Untruthsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the institutional side, Buchanan-Smith and Davies’ study (1995) reveals that institutional response to early warning forecasts is influenced by a variety of external factors – political, attitudinal, legal, financial, logistical, ideological and institutional – that are unrelated to the scientific data. If such factors influence institutional responses, it is equally likely that they should also influence communities’ and households’ responses to early warning, yet our knowledge and understanding of this area remains limited especially in developing countries.…”
Section: Risk Perception and Awarenessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A similar point can be made about the follow-up to the WFS. There is an analogy here with work on early warning systems for drought in Africa: the investment in information may not be matched by investment in action, so that the link between early warning and response becomes 'the missing link' (Buchanan- Smith and Davies 1995). To paraphrase Marshal McLuhan, 'the message itself becomes the message'.…”
Section: The Sceptical Argument Unpackedmentioning
confidence: 99%