7 The Left-Right Schema

Fuchs, Dieter; Klingemann, Hans‐Dieter

doi:10.1515/9783110882193.203

Cited by 348 publications

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“…1 The substantive meaning of the left-right dimension is traditionally associated with the socio-economic cleavages of equality (Lipset et al 1954) and government intervention in the economy (Downs 1957). But the interpretation of the left-right semantic is variable across individuals (e.g., Klingemann 1979;Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983, 225-247;Fuchs and Klingemann 1990), countries (e.g., Huber and Inglehart 1995;Knutsen 1995) and periods (Inglehart 1984;Fuchs and Klingemann 1990;Knutsen 1995). Some scholars interpret respondents' inability to uniformly describe the substantive meaning of the left-right or liberal-conservative semantic as indicative of the dimension's weakness as a cognitive structure -at least for the unsophisticated part of the population (e.g., Converse 1964;Luttberg and Gant 1985;Jacoby 1986).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring Left-Right Political Orientation: The Choice of Response Format

Kroh¹

2007

Public Opinion Quarterly

168

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring Left-Right Political Orientation: The Choice of Response Format

Kroh¹

2007

Public Opinion Quarterly

168

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“…Typically, such broad orientations are described in terms of Left/Right attitudes (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989;Barnes 1997 In some nations, the political discourse is different, and so alternate wording is used for the endpoints of the scale. 3 We are less concerned with the labeling of the scale's poles, as long as these labels reflect the shorthand of political polarization in the nation.…”

Section: Measuring Ideological Positionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Marx's place, however, new political controversies over life style issues, quality of life, and self-expression were emerging in postindustrial societies. This directly led to research on the changing content of "Left" and "Right" in these societies (Inglehart and 4 Klingemann 1976; Inglehart 1984;Fuchs and Klingemann 1989;Knutsen 1995;Evans et al 1996). For older citizens, these terms appear largely synonymous with socioeconomic In short, the nature and content of ideological attachments among publics in the developing world is imprecisely understood.…”

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confidence: 99%

Social Modernization and the End of Ideology Debate: Patterns of Ideological Polarization

Dalton¹

2006

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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Over forty years ago, Daniel Bell made the provocative claim that ideological polarization was diminishing in Western democracies, but new ideologies were emerging and driving politics in developing nations. This article tests the End of Ideology thesis with a new wave of data from the World Values Survey (WVS) that covers over 70 nations representing more than 80 percent of the world's population. We find that polarization along the Left/Right dimension is substantially greater in the less affluent and less democratic societies than in advanced industrial democracies. The correlates of Left/Right orientations also vary systematically across regions. The twin pillars of economic and religious cleavages remain important in European states; cultural values and nationalism provide stronger bases of ideology in Asia and the Middle East. As Bell suggested, social modernization does seem to transform the extent and bases of ideological polarization within contemporary societies. 1 Social Modernization and the End of Ideology Debate: Patterns of Ideological PolarizationIn the halcyon days of the early 1960s, Daniel Bell (1960) made a provocative claim about the "End of Ideology. Bell maintained that "In the Western world, therefore, there is a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a WelfareState; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended" (pg. 373). He also claimed that while ideological debates had been exhausted in the West, new ideologies were emerging and driving politics in Asia and Africa.For more than a generation, the basic premise underlying Bell's claim has been widely debate. The apparent erosion of the class cleavage in Western democracies, and the emergence of a consensus in support of the welfare state were taken as indicators of the erosion of traditional ideological divisions (Kirchheimer 1966;Thomas 1979 Second, we use cross-national aggregate data to test the core hypothesis of whether ideological positions are less polarized in advanced industrial democracies, while continuing to divide the publics in the developing world. Third, we examine the whether the correlates of ideology--and hence the meaning of ideological cleavage--vary systematically across nations. These empirical findings provide the basis for discussing the relationship between social modernization and ideology, and the likely consequences of this relationship for contemporary political systems. The End of Ideology ThesisDaniel Bell premised the End of Ideology Hypothesis on a set of social changes that were transforming Western democracies. One factor was the tremendous economic progress of the mid-20 th century, and the concomitant transformation of the employment patterns and living conditions. In a later work, Bell (1973) stressed the role of ethnicity and nationalism as source of division in developing nations.At the same time, one might add that the struggles over economic well-being...

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“…'imperialistic' character of this ideological scheme (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990) do not follow the work of Hooghe and Marks (Hooghe et al, 2002;Marks et al, 2004). In the present paper, we refrain from distinguishing different dimensions of the left-right divide and concentrate on the one overarching ideological cleavage.…”

Section: Dimensions Of Party Competition In the European Unionmentioning

confidence: 92%

The EU Party System after Eastern Enlargement

Schmitz

Thomassen

2009

Journal of European Integration

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teaching and research staff, visiting professors, graduate students, visiting fellows, and invited participants in seminars, workshops, and conferences. As usual, authors bear full responsibility for the content of their contributions. AbstractFrom 1953 on, a party system of the European Union has been build up with, at the end, some 6 or 7 distinct and more or less cohesive parties acting in parliament and beyond. It has been said that this party system was "ready for power" during the 5 th legislature of the directly elected European Parliament. In this article we ask whether and how Eastern enlargement has changed this state of affairs. The result of the empirical analysis is remarkably ambivalent: first, Eastern enlargement has increased the proportion of "homeless" MEPs, i.e. the non-aligned, and has at the same time added to the strength of the conservative majority of the house. Second, it did not significantly affect the format of the party system nor the stature of its political groups, neither their distinctiveness nor their cohesiveness. And third, the parties from the new Eastern member countries are not yet very well "rooted" in their national electorates. This is why the diagnosis of this early examination has to remain somewhat inconclusive -probably for some years to come. ZusammenfassungSeit 1953

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7 The Left-Right Schema

Cited by 348 publications

References 0 publications

Measuring Left-Right Political Orientation: The Choice of Response Format

Measuring Left-Right Political Orientation: The Choice of Response Format

Social Modernization and the End of Ideology Debate: Patterns of Ideological Polarization

The EU Party System after Eastern Enlargement

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