A choice of selling format in the online marketplace with cross-sales supply chain: Platform selling or traditional reselling?

Li, Xiaojing; Ai, Xingzheng

doi:10.1007/s10660-019-09370-7

Cited by 27 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The e‐tailer's selling contract choice has been extensively studied (Li & Ai, 2021; Yang et al, 2021; Zhang, Li et al, 2021; Zhang & Ma 2022). Abhishek et al (2016) study when the e‐tailer should choose the agency selling contract considering the manufacturer's reaction and cross‐channel network effect.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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Many manufacturers sell products through both the e‐retail and direct channels, which may lead to channel conflicts. To alleviate this, quality differentiation becomes an important marketing strategy for the manufacturer. However, few studies investigate how the form of the e‐tailer's selling contract affects the manufacturer's distribution strategy. Here, we investigate this by establishing a game model in which a manufacturer sells two products with similar functions, but different quality levels, through the direct channel and an e‐tailer. The manufacturer may distribute high‐ and low‐quality products through the direct and e‐tailer channels, respectively, or vice versa. The e‐tailer can choose either the reselling or agency selling contracts. We find that the impact of quality differentiation on equilibria depends on the distribution strategy, contract form, and level of product competition. Under the reselling contract, the manufacturer (he) should distribute high‐quality products directly if the relative efficiency of low‐ to high‐quality products is low. Under the agency selling contract, he should distribute low‐quality products directly if the relative efficiency is moderate. Finally, the e‐tailer (she) should choose the agency selling contract if the production cost is moderate, regardless of the manufacturer's distribution strategy.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Tian et al (2018) illustrate that when the competition between upstream suppliers is weak and the order‐fulfillment cost is low, the intermediary prefers agency selling mode. There are other discussions relevant to online retailers' strategic choices of selling modes recently (Chen et al, 2018; Foros et al, 2017; Hagiu & Wright, 2015; Kim, 2018; Li & Ai, 2019; Tan & Carrillo, 2017; Wirl, 2018; Zhang & Zhang, 2020). In contrast, our paper examines an online retailer's strategic choices of both the new brand introduction and related selling modes and analyzes how the brand competition impacts these choices.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

New brand introduction and selling mode choice for online retailers with network effect

Zhong

Shen

2021

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper builds a game‐theoretic model to examine online retailers' decisions of whether to introduce a new brand and whether to sell it in reselling or agency selling mode if introduced, given one existing brand supplier ex ante. We find it is not always more profitable for the online retailer to introduce the new brand. Interestingly, when determining to introduce the new brand, the online retailer may prefer the agency selling mode even though the commission fee becomes negligible and may not choose the agency selling even if the retailer can earn all sale profit as commission.

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“…Therefore, this study follows the literature and takes the economic activities through the Agency channel as an exemplar of the platform economy (Xu and Lee 2020;Ciulli, Kolk, and Boe-Lillegraven 2019;You 2020). Through the Agency channel, the manufacturer can sell products on the E-retailers' platform by paying commission fees (Hagiu 2007;Li and Ai 2019;Li et al 2019c). The commission fee charged by the E-retailers can be also viewed as the revenue-sharing contract between the E-retailers and the manufacturers (He and Liu 2015).…”

Section: Platform Economy and Distribution Channel Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Through an experiment design study, Widodo and Januardi (2020) have explored the effect of dynamic price sensitivity on manufacturer's pricing decisions in each channel. Other studies include the manufacturer's operating costs for the Self-Run platform, the commission fee of the Agency channel (Wang, Leng, and Liang 2018), the competition among the manufacturers (Li and Ai 2019;Zennyo 2020), sales inefficiency in the Agency channel (Yan, Zhao, and Xing 2019;Yan, Zhao, and Liu 2018) and the strategies of E-retailers (Zhang and Zhang 2020;Li et al 2019c), and so forth.…”

Section: Platform Economy and Distribution Channel Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency or Self-Run: the effect of consumer green education on recyclers’ distribution channel choice under platform economy

Ling

Nie

Lim

et al. 2021

International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications

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Agency or Self-Run: the Effect of Consumer Green Education on Recyclers' Distribution Channel Choice under Platform EconomyAbstract： Consumer green education has significantly affected the green supply chain and recyclers have started to distribute remanufactured products via online platforms. Through a two-period game model, this study examines the effects of consumer green education on the recycler's channel choice. The recyclers sell remanufactured products through either the E-retailer's platform (Agency channel), or their own online platform (Self-Run channel). Surprisingly, our research indicates that a new product seller (E-retailer) can benefit from the remanufactured goods' cannibalization in the Agency channel, provided the consumer green education is under-developed. This finding challenges the traditional opinion that the cannibalization causes loss of profit for new-product sellers. Besides, as the consumer green education effect increases, the recycler prefers the Self-Run channel even with high operational costs. This study provides new insights into the recyclers' channel choice by considering the consumer green effect, thereby extending the research on the remanufactured products' distribution channel strategy.

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A choice of selling format in the online marketplace with cross-sales supply chain: Platform selling or traditional reselling?

Cited by 27 publications

References 29 publications

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

New brand introduction and selling mode choice for online retailers with network effect

Agency or Self-Run: the effect of consumer green education on recyclers’ distribution channel choice under platform economy

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