A Countermeasure against One Physical Cryptanalysis May Benefit Another Attack

Yen, Sung-Ming; Kim, Seungjoo; Lim, So Yeon; Moon, SangJae

doi:10.1007/3-540-45861-1_31

Cited by 67 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…An important lesson taught in [25] is that countermeasures must be considered globally (see also [10]). This was illustrated with the C safe-error attack in [25] and with the M safe-error in [24].…”

Section: Fault Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This was illustrated with the C safe-error attack in [25] and with the M safe-error in [24]. The next paragraphs analyze the security of the Montgomery ladder regarding to the C and M safe-error attacks and highlight the interplay between different countermeasures.…”

Section: Fault Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It was well known that a countermeasure developed against one implementation attack does not necessarily thwart another kind of implementation attack automatically. More surprisingly, in [25], it was pointed out that a countermeasure developed against a given attack, if not carefully examined, may benefit another physical attack tremendously. In that paper, a new type of computational safe-error attack (called a C safe-error attack) was mounted against the classical, side-channel protected exponentiation algorithms of Fig.…”

Section: Fault Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Montgomery Powering Ladder

Joye¹,

Yen

2003

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

342

246

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Abstract. This paper gives a comprehensive analysis of Montgomery powering ladder. Initially developed for fast scalar multiplication on elliptic curves, we extend the scope of Montgomery ladder to any exponentiation in an abelian group. Computationally, the Montgomery ladder has the triple advantage of presenting a Lucas chain structure, of being parallelized, and of sharing a common operand. Furthermore, contrary to the classical binary algorithms, it behaves very regularly, which makes it naturally protected against a large variety of implementation attacks.

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Section: Fault Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fault Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fault Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Montgomery Powering Ladder

Joye¹,

Yen

2003

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

342

246

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“…More importantly, it has been shown that this algorithm can be attacked by a safe-error fault attack [29,30]. If a fault is injected into a multiplication, it will change the output only if the result of that multiplication is used.…”

Section: Algorithm 2: Square-and-multiply-always Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exponent Recoding and Regular Exponentiation Algorithms

Joye

Tunstall

2009

Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2009

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Abstract. This paper describes methods of recoding exponents to allow for regular implementations of m-ary exponentiation algorithms. Recoding algorithms previously proposed in the literature do not lend themselves to being implemented in a regular manner, which is required if the implementation needs to resist side-channel attacks based on simple power analysis. The advantage of the algorithms proposed in this paper over previous work is that the recoding can be readily implemented in a regular manner. Recoding algorithms are proposed for exponentiation algorithms that use both signed and unsigned exponent digits.

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“…It is later discovered that a safe-error [14], [13], i.e. an error that does not affect the final results, can also be exploited to reveal the key.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Systematic security evaluation method against C safe-error attacks

Karaklajic

Fan

Verbauwhede

2011

2011 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust

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This paper proposes a systematic security evaluation of cryptographic hardware against C safe-error attacks. Using the graph representation of a design, we provide a simple and efficient method to detect possible C safe-errors. Exposing possible vulnerabilities at an early stage of a design process, this method avoids costly design re-spins and reduces time-to-market. As a proof of concept, we apply the method to two well-known exponentiation algorithms: square-and-multiply-always and the Montgomery ladder.

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A Countermeasure against One Physical Cryptanalysis May Benefit Another Attack

Cited by 67 publications

References 29 publications

The Montgomery Powering Ladder

The Montgomery Powering Ladder

Exponent Recoding and Regular Exponentiation Algorithms

Systematic security evaluation method against C safe-error attacks

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