A Game-Theoretic Loss Allocation Approach in Power Distribution Systems with High Penetration of Distributed Generations

Pourahmadi, Farzaneh; Dehghanian, Payman

doi:10.3390/math6090158

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…From this analysis, we observe that community energy/P2P trading was the most popular application of the Shapley value, but they were also common in other domains, such as the allocation of distribution loss [30,32,33] and congestion cost [39][40][41], as well as profit distribution in virtual power plants (VPPs) [42][43][44]. There were some less obvious applications, namely, cost allocation of net loss variability [50] and coordinated operation of existing facilities and the emerging power-to-gas technology [51,52].…”

Section: Use Of Shapley Values In Energy Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Efficient methods for approximating the Shapley value for asset sharing in energy communities

et al. 2023

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Section: Use Of Shapley Values In Energy Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Efficient methods for approximating the Shapley value for asset sharing in energy communities

et al. 2023

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“…(2012) combined ANN with Shapley value CGT to solve a given non-linear issue. Pourahmadi and Dehghanian. (2018) presented the Shapley Value, a cooperative game-theory concept for loss allocation in power distribution networks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weighted shapley value: A cooperative game theory for loss allocation in distribution systems

2023

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This paper proposes a new method for assigning distribution system (DS) losses to consumers and distributed generations in the framework of a liberalized energy market. The architecture of the proposed method is based on a synthesis of electrical network analytical theory and cooperative game theory (CGT). Weighted shapely value (WSV) is a solution idea that is regarded to be efficient in CGT for n-player games with characteristic function form. By retaining the notion of electrical networks, the axioms of game theory will be preserved while employing the WSV in loss allocation theory. To allocate system losses, the proposed method estimates the average marginal contribution of each participant to all conceivable coalitions and also determines the weight of the marginal contribution of each participant based on its power rating. Rather than a sequential branch-oriented approach, the proposed methodology is node-oriented. Additionally, a majority rule game is used to constrain the population of a coalition without jeopardizing the efficacy of the solutions to achieve a fair allocation of losses. The results of the proposed method are presented and contrasted with those obtained using the conventional pro-rata method and the well-known Shapley value solution concept in CGT.

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“…Em [59] o método de Aumann-Shapley é utilizado para alocação de perdas em sistemas de distribuição radiais e malhados, com penetração de GD. Aplicação do Valor Shapley para alocação de perdas em sistemas de distribuição com GD podem ser verificados em [60] e [61].…”

Section: Métodos De Tarifaçãounclassified

Valoração Locacional Da Geração Distribuída Em Sistemas De Distribuição via Teoria De Jogos Cooperativos

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Distributed Generation (DG) has deeply changed the classical structure of electrical power systems. In Brazil, the tariff model adopted by the current regulation, called the Energy Compensation System, establishes that the energy injected by DG into the distribution grid fully discounts the energy consumed, with all its tariff components. In vogue, the discussion for new rules regarding the forms of remuneration and valuation of DG involves, on the one hand, distributors, who claim that the current compensation mechanism does not adequately remunerate the use of the distribution system, and, on the other hand, consumers who choose for DG, point out its benefits to society and defend the current model. In this sense, this doctoral thesis proposes a new method for quantifying and allocating DG benefits and costs in distribution systems, which generates a tariff signal capable of translating the effects of its location and presence in the network. The basic concept covers the identification, accounting and sharing of what are called in the proposed method as functions, which represent chargeable characteristics and considered adequate in the study of DG remuneration. In this work, the functions that will be evaluated represent the DG impact on the usage, losses, peak load and reliability of the distribution network. The allocation between generators is performed using the Shapley Value of Cooperative Game Theory. In order to apply the proposed method, two test systems and a real distribution system are used and the obtained results are widely discussed.

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A Game-Theoretic Loss Allocation Approach in Power Distribution Systems with High Penetration of Distributed Generations

Cited by 9 publications

References 33 publications

Efficient methods for approximating the Shapley value for asset sharing in energy communities

Efficient methods for approximating the Shapley value for asset sharing in energy communities

Weighted shapley value: A cooperative game theory for loss allocation in distribution systems

Valoração Locacional Da Geração Distribuída Em Sistemas De Distribuição via Teoria De Jogos Cooperativos

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