A game theoretical approach to the effects of port objective orientation and service differentiation on port authorities' willingness to cooperate

Cui, Han; Notteboom, Theo

doi:10.1016/j.rtbm.2018.03.007

Cited by 24 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 39 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Zhou [15] suggested future research could include a comparison of competition with cooperation strategies of ports serving partially overlapping hinterlands in a situation when ports compete in price and geographic location. Incorporation of more practical problems in the models that would increase the applicability of model at different settings to help robustness was suggested by Ciu and Notteboom [16].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Research results revealed that, when the service levels were the same, the critical factor for competitive ports was location, while service level was the critical factor for the creation of a port alliance. Four types of two-stage games between public/private port authorities were modeled by Ciu and Notteboom [16]. The authors examined the effects of public/private port authority-oriented objectives and how the level of service changed with differential capacity, service price, profits, and welfare when considering competing or cooperating ports.…”

Section: Port and Container Terminal Cooperation/competition And Co-omentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ciu and Notteboom, 2018 [16] Cournot competition Bertrand competition Quantity-Price game Price-Quantity game Two-stage game where: Port makes quantity or pricing decisions. Ports decide to cooperate or compete.…”

Section: Cournot Competition Collusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…while trying to accommodate the growing demand, marine container terminal operators and port authorities have brought attention to the importance of planning and operations optimization to increase productivity and profits. Game theory has given the ability to examine the effects of critical port management decisions such as investments [7][8][9][10][11][12] and pricing policies [10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23] under situations when service level differentiation [13][14][15][16]20,24,25], port ownership [17,21,22], and port regulations [20,26] are considered. Game theory further enables the analysis of various competition and cooperation dynamics between port authorities and terminals, amongst terminals within a port, and between ports and shipping lines.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

A Review of Game Theory Applications for Seaport Cooperation and Competition

Pujats

Golias

Konur

2020

JMSE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the ever-changing maritime shipping industry, ports, and more specifically, container terminals, are always on the search for better policy and operational plan developments. As the maritime shipping sector changes, new areas of research emerge. In this paper, we present a review of recent game theory applications for seaport cooperation and competition, accompanied by summary review tables stating the study, the modeling technique used, the methodology and objective, and summary of the results of each study. In total, we have reviewed 33 studies that used game theory models that investigated seaport and container terminal competition and cooperation involving various stakeholders with dating publication years from 2008 to 2019. The paper concludes with a discussion and proposed future research directions. The purpose of the paper is to serve as a reference guide to recent game theory applications on seaport cooperation and competition that would allow a quick understanding of work done in the field.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Port and Container Terminal Cooperation/competition And Co-omentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cournot Competition Collusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

A Review of Game Theory Applications for Seaport Cooperation and Competition

Pujats

Golias

Konur

2020

JMSE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Since the game between ports is considered as an oligopoly game ( 31 ), it can be assumed that the port group involved in this study is mainly composed of a leader port and a follower port. The two ports can provide some alternative products (services).…”

Section: Problem Description and Modelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inter-Port Competition and Cooperation Under Different Market Environments

Yuan

Wang

Qiang

2021

Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation R

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Aiming at the competition and cooperation decision-making problem between two ports in the same regional port group, this paper studies four kinds of dynamic game scenarios of two adjacent ports—namely, independent strategy–independent strategy (i.e., DD combinations), independent strategy–integrated strategy (i.e., DT combinations), integrated strategy–independent strategy (i.e., TD combinations), and integrated strategy–integrated strategy (i.e., TT combinations). By introducing port demand models and using the dynamic game method, the paper performs a comparative study of port service pricing, port demand, and port profit in different combinations of competition and cooperation. The results show that taking port profit as payment function, the equilibrium strategy of the leader port is the independent strategy, which is also the dominant strategy, while the independent strategy or integrated strategy of the follower port depends on the degree of service substitution provided by the two competing ports. When the degree of service substitution is low (0 < γ < 0.53), the equilibrium strategies of two competing ports are the DD combinations, but the equilibrium strategies can be improved by Pareto, and further analysis shows that TT combinations are the Pareto equilibrium strategies at this time. By contrast, when the degree of service substitution provided by the two competing ports is high (0.53 ≤γ < 1), the DT combinations are the equilibrium strategies of the two competing ports, which are also the Pareto equilibrium strategies at this time. The research shows that when the degree of service substitution of the two ports is low, to encourage the two ports to carry out differentiated development of service functions, it is conducive to promote the two ports to adopt the integrated cooperation strategies.

show abstract

Port Competition

Zhang¹,

Roe²

2019

Maritime Container Port Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A game theoretical approach to the effects of port objective orientation and service differentiation on port authorities' willingness to cooperate

Cited by 24 publications

References 39 publications

A Review of Game Theory Applications for Seaport Cooperation and Competition

A Review of Game Theory Applications for Seaport Cooperation and Competition

Inter-Port Competition and Cooperation Under Different Market Environments

Port Competition

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About