2005
DOI: 10.1177/1091142105275410
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A Hotelling Model of Fiscal Competition

Abstract: This article examines a model in which two jurisdictions engage in fiscal competition. The jurisdictions’ strategic variables are labor tax rates and types of local public goods. Both are determined by majority voting. The article finds that in Nash equilibrium, labor tax rates will be efficiently chosen such that quantities of local public goods will achieve the first-best level. Furthermore, there are two symmetric Nash equilibria for the types of local public goods. These two equilibria, when they both exis… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The literature on fiscal competition using the structure of Hotelling line competition or cross-border shopping includes Kanbur and Keen (1993), Cremer and Gahvari (2000), Wooders and Zissimos (2003) and Hsu (2005) among others. 6 However, our model is different from these papers because we adopt an extended Hotelling model in which the two regions comprise an urban and a rural area, and we do not use the cross-border shopping model.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The literature on fiscal competition using the structure of Hotelling line competition or cross-border shopping includes Kanbur and Keen (1993), Cremer and Gahvari (2000), Wooders and Zissimos (2003) and Hsu (2005) among others. 6 However, our model is different from these papers because we adopt an extended Hotelling model in which the two regions comprise an urban and a rural area, and we do not use the cross-border shopping model.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wilson [1999, s. 269-304] podjął się detalicznego omówienia podstawowych teorii konkurencji podatkowej. W literaturze przedmiotu można spotkać także inne oryginalne ujęcia konkurencji podatkowej oparte na implementacji modelu Hotellinga [1929] z uwzględnieniem teorii gier [Hsu 2005]. Niezależnie od powyższych, ekonomiczna analiza konkurencji podatkowej odzwierciedla się w porównaniu korzyści i kosztów z niej wynikających z odpowiednią analizą dotyczącą koordynacji (harmonizacji) podatkowej [Razin, Sadka 2011], w tym uwzględniając rozmiary konkurujących ze sobą podmiotów [Kanbur, Keen 1993;Haufler, Wooton 1999].…”
Section: Wstępunclassified
“…The tax competition models are based on the Hotelling model (Cremer and Gahvari, 2000;Hsu, 2005;Kanbur and Keen, 1993;Wooders and Zissimos, 2003), which has also been extended to other areas of knowledge, including the structural analysis of health services provided by two hospitals (Aiura and Sanjo, 2010).…”
Section: Theoretical Perspectivementioning
confidence: 99%