A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance

Lackey, Jennifer

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0015

Cited by 171 publications

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“…I should also note that others have argued against the move from Independence to conciliationism (see Sosa [2013] and Lackey [2010]). As I see it, the problem with those discussions is that they focus entirely on disagreement cases.…”

Section: The Death Of Independencementioning

confidence: 92%

From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary

Lord

2013

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Section: The Death Of Independencementioning

confidence: 92%

From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary

Lord

2013

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…There 4 A prominent example of this sort of mixed verdict is Lackey (2010). 5 Here, and throughout the paper, this sort of formulation is only roughly right, because it is often suggested that, even from a narrow epistemic point of view, there is more that matters than just getting at the truth (and avoiding error).…”

Section: Self-trust and Other Doxastic Valuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disagreement and the value of self-trust

Pasnau

2014

Philos Stud

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Controversy over the epistemology of disagreement endures because there is an unnoticed factor at work: the intrinsic value we give to self-trust. Even if there are many instances of disagreement where, from a strictly epistemic or rational point of view, we ought to suspend belief, there are other values at work that influence our all-things considered judgments about what we ought to believe. Hence those who would give equal-weight to both sides in many cases of disagreement may be right, from the perspective of pure rationality. But their critics are right too, in seeing something undesirable in the consequences of giving equal weight. Among epistemologists, there is a tendency to set aside trust and other such non-epistemic factors, on the grounds that these are not germane to their topic. But ultimately, the value of self-trust shows signs of encroaching on the strictly epistemic question of when our beliefs may be said to be justified. Hence again, even if the equal-weighters are right about what is rational, they may be wrong about what knowledge requires.

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“…12 However, both Kelly (2010) and Lackey (2010) offer apparent counterexamples to this independence constraint. For instance, in cases where our…”

Section: ; Elga 2007)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Only Externalists Can Be Steadfast

Ridder

2013

Erkenn

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What is the rational response to disagreement with an epistemic peer? Some say the steadfast response of holding on to your own belief can be rational; others argue that some degree of conciliation is always rationally required. I argue that only an epistemological externalist about rationality -someone who holds that the rationality of a belief is partly constituted by factors outside a subject's cognitive perspective -can defend the steadfast view. Or at least that this is so in the kinds of idealized cases of peer disagreement that take center stage in the current debate about disagreement. The argument has three steps. First, I show how rationality internalism motivates conciliationism: In view of the mutually recognized internal epistemic symmetry between peers, it would be arbitrary for either peer to hold on to her own belief.Second, I strengthen this line of thought by considering various proposed 'symmetry breakers' that appear to introduce a relevant asymmetry between peers, which could be used to defend the rationality of a steadfast response. I argue that none of these alleged symmetry breakers can help internalists. Third, I show how externalism does have the resources to 2 defend steadfastness and expose how extant defenses of steadfastness implicitly rely on externalist intuitions.

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A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance

Cited by 171 publications

References 0 publications

From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary

From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary

Disagreement and the value of self-trust

Why Only Externalists Can Be Steadfast

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