A model for assessment and mitigation of threats on the college campus

Abstract

Purpose-An increase in the number of disruptive and violent events on college and university campuses instigated this review of the methods used to interrupt the trend, with the goal of identifying a preliminary model for systematic management of such threats. The intent is to instigate research, review and discussion in order to decrease the number and severity of threatening incidents on college campuses. Design/methodology/approach-Thorough review of plans from primary and secondary education, plans in use in higher education, literature on risk and threat assessment, literature on "whistle blowers", and of violent events on college campuses was used to construct a model. Findings-It was found that, in terms of managing and reducing threats to people who study, live and work in post-secondary educational institutions, insufficient attention has been given to the unique needs of this setting and therefore efforts to mitigate threats have been insufficient. The investigation resulted in the development of a model of assessment and management of threats on university and college campuses. Research limitations/implications-College campus threat assessment research is very much in its infancy and will certainly develop over time. This paper is the first step in an effort to develop and ultimately test the plausibility of a model. Future research should be pursued to determinewhether the model holds up under a majority of situations on college campuses. Those involved in threat mitigation in university settings should be queried to determine their agreement with the proposed framework and for assistance in refining it. Originality/value-This paper presents suggestions for the systematic management of threats and mitigation in university settings.

Identifying high‐risk firearm owners to prevent mass violence

“…Finally, given the large proportion of mass shootings where prior communications and behavior signal danger, an obvious topic to explore further is how to optimize the use of GVROs. When shootings occur, it has become routine to determine how often signals were detected but not reported and how often signals were reported but not acted on (Bolante & Dykeman, ; Pollard, Nolan, & Deisinger, ; Weisenbach Keller, Hughes, & Hertz, ). Again, specificity will be a concern.…”

“…Although there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that GVROs and similar policies may thwart mass violence, this case‐by‐case approach is necessarily limited: its efficacy is reliant on third‐party reports of warning signs, which are not always made, passed to the appropriate authorities, or acted on (Bolante & Dykeman, ; Pollard et al., ; Weisenbach Keller et al., ). More fundamentally, even an effective case‐by‐case approach cannot be scaled up to the population level.…”

University policy support for threat assessment: A case analysis of public higher education institutions in one U.S. state.

“…Within the past 15 years, university-based threat assessment teams have started to become more utilized on college campuses to respond to threatening behavior on campus (E. R. D. Deisinger & Scalora, 2016). Threat assessment teams should be activated any time a member of the campus community displays concerning behavior that leads other individuals to believe that a potential exists for harm to others (Keller et al, 2011). This process involves an examination of the threat, the motivations behind the threat, and the presence of any plan to carry out the threat (Mitchell & Palk, 2016).…”

Tertiary concerns: Campus threat assessment and management in an Australian university.

“…A large body of research has established the principles and indicators of best practice in campus threat assessment and management teams in the USA (Böckler et al, 2013; Drysdale et al, 2010; Fein et al, 2004; Mohandie, 2002; Randazzo & Plummer, 2009; Van Brunt, 2012; Weisenbach Keller et al, 2011). Team membership typically comprises subject matter experts from varied disciplines representing faculty, campus security/police, student discipline, student counseling/welfare services, residences, legal counsel, and human resources (Deisinger, et al, 2008; Randazzo & Plummer, 2009; Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007; Weisenbach Keller et al, 2011). The team receives referrals, identifies a situation or person of concern, gathers information and investigates, assesses the information and risks, and implements actions to manage the person and situation with the overall aim of reducing the threat (Pollard, 2012).…”

“…The team receives referrals, identifies a situation or person of concern, gathers information and investigates, assesses the information and risks, and implements actions to manage the person and situation with the overall aim of reducing the threat (Pollard, 2012). The team’s actions are underpinned by relevant legislation, including the Clery Act (relating to emergency notification systems) and privacy laws, as well as institutional policies and procedures (Randazzo & Plummer, 2009; Weisenbach Keller et al, 2011). The success of the team is dependent on building University wide awareness of the team, encouraging early reporting of concerning behaviors or threats, and effectively responding to and managing reported threats (Randazzo & Plummer, 2009).…”