A new bidding framework for combinatorial e-auctions

Abrache, Jawad; Bourbeau, Benoît; Crainic, Teodor Gabriel; Gendreau, Michel

doi:10.1016/s0305-0548(03)00071-6

Cited by 23 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…A language in computer science and logic assigns a semantic to a syntax. Bidding languages have been studied in the context of combinatorial auctions (Boutilier and Hoos 2001, Abrache et al 2004, Nisan 2006. However, this research typically focuses on multi-item, but single-unit negotiations.…”

Section: Bidding Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope

Bichler

Schneider

Güler

et al. 2011

European Journal of Operational Research

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Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it becomes prohibitive even for small instances of multiunit combinatorial auctions, as suppliers cannot be expected to enumerate a sufficient number of bids that would allow an auctioneer to find the efficient allocation. Auction design for markets with economies of scale and scope are much less well understood. They require more compact and yet expressive bidding languages, and the supplier selection typically is a hard computational problem. In this paper, we propose a compact bidding language to express the characteristics of a supplier's cost function in markets with economies of scale and scope. Bidders in these auctions can specify various discounts and markups on overall spend on all items or selected item sets, and specify complex conditions for these pricing rules. We propose an optimization formulation to solve the resulting supplier selection problem and provide an extensive experimental evaluation. We also discuss the impact of different language features on the computational effort, on total spend, and the knowledge representation of the bids. Interestingly, while in most settings volume discount bids can lead to significant cost savings, some types of volume discount bids can be worse than split-award auctions in simple settings.

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Section: Bidding Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope

Bichler

Schneider

Güler

et al. 2011

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…Actually, Boutilier and Hoos argue that this language has the potential to represent any utility function and to express certain bids more succinctly than prior bidding languages (in particular, Nisan's OR language). (Abrache et al 2004a) pointed out that all the languages previously considered in the literature were formalized for one-sided combinatorial auctions of indivisible single-unit items. They present a new bidding language framework that is independent of the physical nature of the items traded and their divisibility.…”

Section: Motivation and State Of The Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combinatorial auctions

et al. 2007

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Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose avenues for further research.

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“…Abrache et al (2002) pointed out that Nisan's bidding vocabulary is restrictive in that it cannot express such requests as " select K among N items" and is limited to indivisible goods. As a result, they proposed a two-level bidding framework to represent combined bids and analyzed its impact on the mathematical programming formulation of the allocation problem.…”

Section: Gdp (Bts 1997)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Approximation algorithms for the bid construction problem in combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts

Song

Regan

2005

Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

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The bid valuation and construction problem for carriers facing combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts is very difficult and involves the computation of a number of NP-hard sub problems. In this paper we examine computationally tractable approximation methods for estimating these values and constructing bids. The benefit of our approximation method is that it provides a way for carriers to construct optimal or near optimal bids by solving a single NP-hard problem. This represents a significant improvement in efficiency. In addition, this method can be extended to many other applications.

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A new bidding framework for combinatorial e-auctions

Cited by 23 publications

References 9 publications

Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope

Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope

Combinatorial auctions

Approximation algorithms for the bid construction problem in combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts

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