A new look at the UI effect on transitions from unemployment into wage employment in Spain: the limited duration of the UI benefits entitlement

Abstract

This article is a new look at the study of the unemployment insurance effect on the transition probability from unemployment into wage employment in Spain. It is found that individuals increase their search effort and reduce their reservation wage as the unemployment insurance benefit entitlement exhaustion approaches, and their exit rate equals that of the unemployed who never got benefits from the exhaustion moment. Financial constraints are not important in Spain. Business cycle affects more to long-term unemployed. And, finally, it is found that the probability of being offered a vacancy decreases with time spent in unemployment, having allowed for unobservable heterogeneity.

The Influence of Temporary Employment on Unemployment Exits in a Competing Risks Framework

“…Our results indicate that the receipt of unemployment benefits partially influences the exit process: it translates into a lower probability of exiting to temporary employment (women), self-employment and inactivity. 15 This effect of benefits on exiting unemployment into employment agrees with what has been found previously with the Spanish LFS data (Alba-Ramírez 1999;Bover et al 2002;Gonzalo 2002). However, when it is interacted with the duration of the last job (to capture benefits' potential entitlement), we find that recipients with longer potential durations are those who exhibit lower hazards to temporary employment (men and women) and larger hazards to inactivity (men) but no adverse effect is found on the exit to permanent employment (results not shown).…”

“…Nonetheless, the relationship between educational attainment and hazard rates is by no means monotonic. The reason may be that the educational level segments the labour market and, therefore, workers search for a job in their own labour segment (Gonzalo 2002). As such, the probability of receiving a job offer does not depend on the level of education and, although the reservation wage is higher for the unemployed with more formal education, their probability of accepting a job offer is not lower since the number of wage offers is also higher.…”

Coaching for survival: the hazards of head coach careers in the German ‘Bundesliga’

“…This technique has been previously used in sports by Okhusa (1999Okhusa ( , 2001) and Frick, Pietzner and Prinz (2006) and is currently being adopted elsewhere in fields such as labour economics (Carrasco 1999;Tribó, 2005;Cueto and Mato, 2006;Collier, 2005;Haurin and Sridhar, 2003;Gonzalo, 2002), in international relations (Box Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn 2003;Barros, Passos and Alana, 2005), corporate finance (Holtz-Eakin et al 1994, Orbe, Ferreira andNúñez Antón, 2002;Leung, Rigby and Young, 2003) and industry (Requena-Silvente and Walker, 2005).…”

Re-employment probabilities of unemployment benefit recipients

“…Many studies have stressed that individual transitions out of unemployment depend on the extent to which recall by the previous employer is expected (Jensen and Westerga˚rd-Nielsen, 1990;Corak, 1996;Rosholm and Svarer, 2001;Jensen and Svarer, 2003;Røed and Nordberg, 2003). In Spain, research on unemployment duration has exclusively focused on the generosity of the UCS without distinguishing recalls from new job hazards (Alba, 1999;Bover et al, 2002;Gonzalo, 2002;Jenkins and Garcı´a-Serrano, 2004;Arranz and Muro, 2007;Arranz et al, 2009).…”