A Policy-Driven Trading Framework for Market-Based Spectrum Assignment

Argyroudis, Patroklos; Forde, Tim; Doyle, Linda; O’Mahony, Donal

doi:10.1109/policy.2007.2

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Argyroudis et al [9] have described a policy-driven trading framework for market-based spectrum assignment that allows spectrum consumers to trade exclusive access rights to spectrum blocks (specified by geographic location, frequency band and time period) for electronic payments. They have used the Keynote trust management system [16] to implement a prototype of their policy model and have incorporated realtime hash chain micropayment scheme [17] (via Keynote credentials) to handle monetary exchanges.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Further, we have also outlined an architecture in which such exclusive access rights to a portion of the spectrum could be used to regulate the transmission of radio devices to enable proactive enforcement of the spectrum usage policies and to deter unauthorized transmissions. Moreover, we would also like to point out that we have used the terminology of Argyroudis et al [9] regarding the buying and selling of spectrum to mean the buying and selling of exclusive spectrum usage rights; and the term spectrum consumers to refer to agents (such as cellular network operators, TV companies, wireless broadband providers, end users, etc.) that buy and sell, transfer or lease such exclusive spectrum usage rights.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Law governed peer-to-peer secondary spectrum marketplaces

Dudheria

Trappe

Minsky

2013

8th International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks

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Abstract-We describe a decentralized peer-to-peer online secondary spectrum marketplace, where consumers can trade exclusive access rights to a specific portion of the spectrum (designated by geographic location, frequency band and time period) in return for fee payment, under the constraint of obeying the trading rules formulated by the government. The main advantage of such an innovative secondary spectrum marketplace over the current state of the art is that it reduces the complexity of spectrum management by removing governmental agencies from being directly involved in the completion of such transactions. The proposed model allows spectrum consumers to sell, lease or transfer the access rights to a chunk of spectrum by disaggregating, partitioning or time-sharing the corresponding spectrum in their possession. Further, we also outline an architecture in which such exclusive access rights to a portion of the spectrum could be used to regulate radio device transmission to enable proactive enforcement of the spectrum usage policies and to deter unauthorized transmissions. Overall, our secondary spectrum marketplace model has the potential to reduce cost, increase spectrum efficiency, and to simplify the task of spectrum management.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Law governed peer-to-peer secondary spectrum marketplaces

Dudheria

Trappe

Minsky

2013

8th International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks

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“…Logically, the auctioneer should be a co-located entity in the SS, acting as a trusted-third-party. In [13], we have addressed a number of issues pertaining to the secure network implementation of general trading mechanisms.…”

Section: A Combinatorial Clock Auction For Ofdma-based Accessmentioning

confidence: 99%

A combinatorial clock auction for OFDMA-based cognitive wireless networks

Forde

Doyle

2008

2008 3rd International Symposium on Wireless Pervasive Computing

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Abstract-This paper presents a novel application of a market-based spectrum assignment mechanism for exploitation by cognitive radio systems. Advances in DSA policy mean that regulators are moving towards a more liberalised system of spectrum rights which give more freedom to spectrum users to choose the radio and networking technologies, services and frequencies that suit their technical and economic needs. The paper describes a combinatorial clock auction mechanism that allows for the trade of spectrum rights in the context of an OFDMAbased cognitive wireless network.While governments can use complex and cumbersome auctions to sell off large blocks of spectrum at the macro level, it will be necessary to employ cognitive wireless networks to organise the distribution of such spectrum rights at the network level. Cognitive functionality is important so that DSA-enabled wireless networks can understand the regulatory, technical and economic context within which they find themselves. The combinatorial clock auction is a mechanism that will facilitate the multilateral trade of spectrum rights among competing cognitive radios.

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“…4 In particular, the FCC made it easier for spectrum to be provided to secondary users for any length of time, time of day, size of coverage area, and frequency or number of channels up to the full capacity of the original license. Nevertheless, the market to sub-let licenses is not an active one.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 The underutilization of spectrum coupled with developments in spectrum-agile mobile devices has prompted a number of proposals for managing spectrum. On one side are proposals based on exclusive use [4], [14], [15], [23] and secondary markets [3], [8], [31], [36], [42]. Both presume some notion of spectrum property rights.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum Markets for Wireless Services

Bae

Beigman²,

Berry³

et al. 2008

2008 3rd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

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Abstract-It has been widely recognized that the current under-utilization of spectrum across many bands could be alleviated through the application of spectrum markets. So far, discussions of market mechanisms for spectrum allocations have focused primarily on secondary markets, which are managed by licensees. Here we explore the consequences of lifting current restrictions on allocations and ownership, and allowing more extensive markets for allocating spectrum across locations, times, and diverse sets of applications (e.g., broadcast, cellular, broadband data, emergency, etc).To motivate our discussion we first estimate the achievable rate per user that could be provided by sharing a large portion of the spectrum suitable for cellular and broadcast types of services. Our results suggest that in general the demand for spectrum may exceed supply implying that market mechanisms are needed to avoid a tragedy of the commons (i.e., associated with an alternative commons model). We then discuss a twotier spectrum market structure for wireless services in which licenses for spectrum assets at particular locations are traded as commodities. Spectrum owners can choose to rent or lease their spectrum assets via spot markets at particular locations. Such an approach may lower barriers to entry into the wireless services market thereby facilitating competition and the introduction of new services.

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A Policy-Driven Trading Framework for Market-Based Spectrum Assignment

Cited by 7 publications

References 12 publications

Law governed peer-to-peer secondary spectrum marketplaces

Law governed peer-to-peer secondary spectrum marketplaces

A combinatorial clock auction for OFDMA-based cognitive wireless networks

Spectrum Markets for Wireless Services

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