A random graph model of kidney exchanges

Toulis, Panagiotis; Parkes, David C.

doi:10.1145/1993574.1993626

Cited by 13 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Our random model assures that this difference is small enough to avoid the need for such four-way exchanges (note from Figure 2 that such a four-way exchange becomes inefficient, since it uses an AB-O pair that could instead have been used in a three-way exchange and an A-B pair that could have been used in either a two-way or a three-way exchange, for a total of more than four transplants). Toulis and Parkes (2011) prove a similar result to ours.…”

Section: Either Every B-a Pair Is Matched In a Two-way Exchange With supporting

confidence: 87%

“…1. Toulis and Parkes (2011) show a similar result only under their assumption that each hospital has a canonical structure (see the first remark at the end of Section 6). Another important difference is that they do not allow hospitals to withhold a single pair (only internal allocations).…”

mentioning

confidence: 78%

“…Roth et al (2007) studied efficiency in large markets without considering incentives or directly modeling tissue-type incompatibilities. They showed that exchanges of size 10 See Toulis and Parkes (2011), who quantify the benefit from a centralized clearinghouse for organizing two-way exchange. 11 Some weighted matching algorithms currently in use put some weight on internal exchanges, but this does not solve the problem, since it neither guarantees a hospital the exchanges it could conduct internally nor does it guarantee that the pairs that could be internally exchanged will be used efficiently if submitted to the central clearinghouse.…”

Section: Free Ridingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13 Our work extends that negative result for small markets to show that efficient mechanisms cannot even be individually rational, but, more importantly, we provide positive results in large random markets. Toulis and Parkes (2011) also adopt a random graph model to study mechanisms for kidney exchange and provide useful quantitative welfare results. Their results are close to ours, but with a very different model of how the market grows large.…”

Section: Free Ridingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1. Toulis and Parkes (2011) provide an algorithm that finds an efficient individually rational allocation. However, there is a major difference in their model; in contrast to our regularity assumption, they assume each hospital is large enough so that it contains an efficient allocation with the structure provided in Figure 5, which they term a canonical allocation.…”

Section: Individual Rationality Is Not Very Costly In Large Random Comentioning

confidence: 99%

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Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange

Ashlagi

Roth

2014

Theoretical Economics

129

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As multi-hospital kidney exchange has grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already been observed.We show that as the population of hospitals and patients grows, the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully becomes low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individual rationality is high-in lost transplants. We identify a mechanism that gives hospitals incentives to reveal all patient-donor pairs. We observe that if such a mechanism were to be implemented and hospitals enrolled all their pairs, the resulting patient pools would allow efficient matchings that could be implemented with two-and three-way exchanges.We have had valuable conversations about this paper with Itay Fainmesser, Duncan Gilchrist, Jacob Leshno, and Mike Rees, and have benefited from comments by participants at the NBER Market Design conference and the Harvard-MIT Economic Theory seminar. We also thank the editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments.1 This was the case in the labor market for gastroenterologists. What had been a national marketplace collapsed into a set of small local marketplaces in which gastroenterology fellowship positions were increasingly filled by local candidates, often from the same hospital (see Niederle and Roth 2003). To repair

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Section: Either Every B-a Pair Is Matched In a Two-way Exchange With supporting

confidence: 87%

mentioning

confidence: 78%

Section: Free Ridingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Free Ridingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Individual Rationality Is Not Very Costly In Large Random Comentioning

confidence: 99%

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Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange

Ashlagi

Roth

2014

Theoretical Economics

129

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An Improved 2-Agent Kidney Exchange Mechanism

Caragiannis

Filos-Ratsikas

Procaccia

2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Paired and Altruistic Kidney Donation in the UK: Algorithms and Experimentation

Manlove

O'Malley

2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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We study the computational problem of identifying optimal sets of kidney exchanges in the UK. We show how to expand an integer programming-based formulation due to Roth et al. [2007] in order to model the criteria that constitute the UK definition of optimality. The software arising from this work has been used by the National Health Service Blood and Transplant to find optimal sets of kidney exchanges for their National Living Donor Kidney Sharing Schemes since July 2008. We report on the characteristics of the solutions that have been obtained in matching runs of the scheme since this time. We then present empirical results arising from experiments on the real datasets that stem from these matching runs, with the aim of establishing the extent to which the particular optimality criteria that are present in the UK influence the structure of the solutions that are ultimately computed. A key observation is that allowing 4-way exchanges would be likely to lead to a moderate number of additional transplants.

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A random graph model of kidney exchanges

Cited by 13 publications

References 13 publications

Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange

Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange

An Improved 2-Agent Kidney Exchange Mechanism

Paired and Altruistic Kidney Donation in the UK: Algorithms and Experimentation

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