A Slippery Slope: The Domestic Diffusion of Ethnic Civil War

Abstract

Why do most civil wars occur in a relatively small number of countries? We answer this question by analyzing how civil wars diffuse in multiethnic states. Our theory outlines two motivation and two opportunity mechanisms that trigger additional ethnic rebellions in the same state. First, ongoing civil wars motivate members of other ethnic groups to mobilize in reaction to the negative externalities of nearby conflict. Second, ethnic groups emulate nearby rebel groups as a means of addressing preexisting grievances. Third, fighting multiple civil wars drains state capacity, opening the door for additional challengers to rebel against the government. Finally, long-lasting civil wars signal that the state is unable to defeat active rebels, thus creating incentives for new challengers to take up arms. We test our mechanisms in all multiethnic states with a history of armed conflict between 1946 and 2006. Using Geographic Information Systems, we construct overlap and minimum distance measures between ethnic groups' settlement patterns and conflict zones. Our statistical analysis indicates that new ethnic civil war onsets are more likely in the vicinity of ongoing armed conflicts. Ethnic civil wars also diffuse as governments face an increasing number of rebels and longer rebellions.

Explaining Support for Political Violence: Grievance and Perceived Opportunity

“…The interaction between grievance and opportunity has been highlighted in macro-oriented studies, which show that motivation and opportunity structures are complementary, rather than competing, explanations of armed conflict. The onset (and recurrence) of armed conflict requires a combination of motivation and opportunity (D. E. Cunningham et al 2017; White et al 2015; Bormann and Hammond 2016; Bara 2014). While grievances provide the motivation, the economic and political opportunity structure determines the shape of the contention (K. G. Cunningham 2013) and thus the risk of conflict.…”

“…This article takes microlevel investigations of support for violence a step further. Recent macrolevel studies posit a joint effect of motivation and opportunity structure (D. E. Cunningham et al 2017; White et al 2015; Bormann and Hammond 2016; Bara 2014). Yet, its individual-level corollary, that people’s perceptions of the political system condition the relationship between grievances and support for violence, has received little attention.…”

Reputation, concessions, and territorial civil war

“…As many theories of ethnic politics predict that political elites will be loath to share power (Bates, 1974;Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003), conflict researchers should dedicate more attention to identifying openings for more inclusive and accommodating regimes before civil war breaks out (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011;Cunningham, 2013b). This task is all the more urgent because fighting civil wars itself increases the risk of violent demonstration effects (Bormann & Hammond, 2016). Governments engaged in an ongoing rebellion thus face a Catch-22 situation when deciding whether to continue confronting or to concede to one challenger.…”

Do they know something we don’t? Diffusion of repression in authoritarian regimes

“…First, there is evidence that violence, in the form of protests, riots or civil war, tends to permeate national boundaries and to diffuse between countries (Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Bormann & Hammond, 2016). Danneman & Ritter (2014) find that states increase repression early to prevent externalities from neighbouring civil wars.…”

“…With respect to state repression, this article shows that there is a transnational dimension that drives domestic levels of repression in authoritarian regimes. With respect to diffusion processes in conflict, I show that there is a transnational dimension of regimes’ strategies to deal with dissent (Bormann & Hammond, 2016; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Finally, in relation to international dimensions of authoritarian rule, this is the first study that goes beyond comparative case studies to provide systematic evidence of diffusion of repression between authoritarian regimes (Bader, 2015; Odinius & Kuntz, 2015; Tolstrup, 2015; Way, 2015).…”