A Survey on Fault Attacks

Giraud, Christophe; Thiebeauld, Hugues

doi:10.1007/1-4020-8147-2_11

Cited by 94 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Since such a disturbance can be achieved thanks to a fault injection [13], the attacker can run within her own applet a method trying to store the reference of the APDU buffer array into a global array and disturb the conditional branching execution to avoid the SecurityException.…”

Section: Listing 11 Detection Of Apdu Buffer Storage Attempt In Putmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technologies and Innovation

Valencia‐García¹,

Lagos-Ortíz²,

Alcaraz-Mármol³

et al. 2016

Communications in Computer and Information Science

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Section: Listing 11 Detection Of Apdu Buffer Storage Attempt In Putmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technologies and Innovation

Valencia‐García¹,

Lagos-Ortíz²,

Alcaraz-Mármol³

et al. 2016

Communications in Computer and Information Science

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“…Known fault attacks against exponentiation-based cryptosystems assume pretty strong fault models (see [11], [12] for recent surveys). One exception are the skipping attacks due to Schmidt and Herbst against RSA.…”

Section: Skipping Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Method for Preventing "Skipping" Attacks

Joye

2012

2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops

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Abstract-Until recently, known fault attacks against (non-CRT) exponentiation-based cryptosystems were supposed to be of rather theoretical nature, as they require a precise fault injection, e.g., a bit flip. However, Schmidt and Herbst (FDTC 2008) reported practical fault-attacks against RSA in standard mode using low-cost equipment. Although their attacks were described against RSA, they readily extend to any other exponentiation-based cryptosystem. This paper describes an efficient method to prevent those new attacks.

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“…To achieve a resistant implementation, well-known countermeasures could be inserted, like execution flow controls, doubling sensitive operations and checking their coherency, variable redundancies, etc (cf. [8]). In the context of our attacks, the checkcast bytecode should then be considered as sensitive and handled accordingly.…”

Section: Security Concernsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although fault attacks have been mainly used in the literature from a cryptanalytic angle [2,6,3], their strength is to potentially stress every code layers embedded in a device. Practical details and comprehensive consequences could be found in [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attacks on Java Card 3.0 Combining Fault and Logical Attacks

Barbu

Thiebeauld

Guerin

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Java Cards have been threatened so far by attacks using ill-formed applications which assume that the application bytecode is not verified. This assumption remained realistic as long as the bytecode verifier was commonly executed off-card and could thus be bypassed. Nevertheless it can no longer be applied to the Java Card 3 Connected Edition context where the bytecode verification is necessarily performed on-card. Therefore Java Card 3 Connected Edition seems to be immune against this kind of attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate that running ill-formed application does not necessarily mean loading and installing ill-formed application. For that purpose, we introduce a brand new kind of attack which combines fault injection and logical tampering. By these means, we describe two case studies taking place in the new Java Card 3 context. The first one shows how ill-formed applications can still be introduced and executed despite the on-card bytecode verifier. The second example leads to the modification of any method already installed on the card into any malicious bytecode. Finally we successfully mount these attacks on a recent device, emphasizing the necessity of taking into account these new threats when implementing Java Card 3 features.

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A Survey on Fault Attacks

Cited by 94 publications

References 22 publications

Technologies and Innovation

Technologies and Innovation

A Method for Preventing "Skipping" Attacks

Attacks on Java Card 3.0 Combining Fault and Logical Attacks

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