A Systems Theoretic Accident Model Applied to Biodefense

Laracy, Joseph R.

doi:10.1080/14751790600933905

Cited by 16 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The term accident model is frequently used in the literature (Leveson, 2004;Grabowski et al, 2000;Nikolaos et al, 2004;Laracy, 2006). Accident analysis, which always implies an accident model (Hollnagel, 2002), is a very important process for providing input to the development of proactive and cost-effective regulations (Psarros et al, 2010).…”

Section: Accident Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Further, many models are based on theories or concepts, for example systems theory concepts (Leveson, 2004;Laracy, 2006;Larsson et al, 2010), the Bayesian Belief Network concept (BBN) (Trucco et al, 2008;Merrick and Singh, 2003), Neural Networks (NN) concept (Hashemi et al, 1995;Le Blanc et al, 2001), fuzzy logic (Sii et al, 2001), risk-based approaches (Vanem and Skjong, 2006;Celik et al, 2010), simulation and expert judgment (Harrald et al, 1998). Harrald et al (1998) have pointed out that a theoretical framework is of little use in an analysis unless there is relevant data to support it.…”

Section: Accident Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A grounded theory model for analysis of marine accidents

Mullai

Paulsson

2011

Accident Analysis & Prevention

106

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Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Mullai, A., & Paulsson, U. (2011). A grounded theory model for analysis of marine accidents. Accident; analysis and prevention, 43(4), 1590 -1603 . DOI: 10.1016 /j.aap.2011 General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. b s t r a c tThe purpose of this paper was to design a conceptual model for analysis of marine accidents. The model is grounded on large amounts of empirical data, i.e. the Swedish Maritime Administration database, which was thoroughly studied. This database contains marine accidents organized by ship and variable. The majority of variables are non-metric and some have never been analyzed because of the large number of values. Summary statistics were employed in the data analysis. In order to develop a conceptual model, the database variables were clustered into eleven main categories or constructs, which were organized according to their properties and connected with the path diagram of relationships. For demonstration purposes, one non-metric and five metric variables were selected, namely fatality, ship's properties (i.e. age, gross register tonnage, and length), number of people on board, and marine accidents. These were analyzed using the structural equation modeling (SEM) approach. The combined prediction power of the 'ship's properties' and 'number of people on board' independent variables accounted for 65% of the variance of the fatality. The model development was largely based on the data contained in the Swedish database. However, as this database shares a number of variables in common with other databases in the region and the world, the model presented in this paper could be applied to other datasets. The model has both theoretical and practical values. Recommendations for improvements in the database are also suggested.

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Section: Accident Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Accident Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A grounded theory model for analysis of marine accidents

Mullai

Paulsson

2011

Accident Analysis & Prevention

106

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“…This approach is usually conducted in an unsystematic way and reduces or removes only the most obvious vulnerabilities [5]. If a systematic approach is taken to develop a comprehensive body of best practice literature, the best practice approach would be far more useful to engineers developing large systems.…”

Section: Classical Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Informal, ad hoc approaches will almost certainly fall short of accomplishing the desired goal of little to no casualties [5]. A rigorous, systematic method is necessary to develop an appropriate approach.…”

Section: Aircraft and Ground Operatorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Systems-Theoretic Security Model for Large Scale, Complex Systems Applied to the US Air Transportation System

Laracy¹

2017

IJCNS

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Classical risk-based or game-theoretic security models rely on assumptions from reliability theory and rational expectations economics that are not applicable to security threats. Additionally, these models suffer from serious deficiencies when they are applied to software-intensive, socio-technical systems. A new approach is proposed in this paper that applies principles from control theory to enforce constraints on security threats thereby extending techniques used in system safety engineering. It is applied to identify and mitigate the threats that could emerge in critical infrastructures such as the air transportation system. Insights are provided to assist systems engineers and policy makers in securely transitioning to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS).

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“…Inadequate controls previously identifi ed can be prioritized by quantitatively assessing their impact on key system safety variables. Additionally, response mechanisms can be tested, and their effectiveness judged (Laracy 2006).…”

Section: System-theoretic Accident Models and Processes (Stamp)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Addressing System Boundary Issues in Complex Socio-Technical Systems

Laracy

2007

Syst. Res. Forum

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Systems engineering researchers are familiar with a variety of challenges associated with doing foundational research in complex socio-technical systems. Some foundational issues have been avoided by focusing on applied research questions and ignoring the "socio" of the engineering system under development. Considerations of large-scale engineering systems often present a dilemma of where to draw the line between a system and its environment. How are social, political, economic, and institutional issues addressed? The lack of suitable methodologies for understanding the interface between a technical system and the human and organizational it exists within is a stumbling block. The author suggests a way ahead drawing on the ancestral disciplines of systems science. This approach led to the development of a system safety engineering methodology, System-theoretic Accident Models and Processes (STAMP), which has had signifi cant impact on industry and the practice of safety engineering.

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A Systems Theoretic Accident Model Applied to Biodefense

Cited by 16 publications

References 2 publications

A grounded theory model for analysis of marine accidents

A grounded theory model for analysis of marine accidents

A Systems-Theoretic Security Model for Large Scale, Complex Systems Applied to the US Air Transportation System

Addressing System Boundary Issues in Complex Socio-Technical Systems

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