No abstract

No abstract

Systems engineering researchers are familiar with a variety of challenges associated with doing foundational research in complex socio-technical systems. Some foundational issues have been avoided by focusing on applied research questions and ignoring the "socio" of the engineering system under development. Considerations of large-scale engineering systems often present a dilemma of where to draw the line between a system and its environment. How are social, political, economic, and institutional issues addressed? The lack of suitable methodologies for understanding the interface between a technical system and the human and organizational it exists within is a stumbling block. The author suggests a way ahead drawing on the ancestral disciplines of systems science. This approach led to the development of a system safety engineering methodology, System-theoretic Accident Models and Processes (STAMP), which has had signifi cant impact on industry and the practice of safety engineering.

The presence of space situational awareness is one approach to mitigating the long-term risks associated with space debris in low Earth orbit (LEO). As the U.S. and other nations continue to develop the space situational awareness mission area, questions arise as to how stakeholders should act to mitigate the effects of resident space objects and how our understanding of the physics of LEO inform the evolution of ground-and space-based sensors. To characterize interactions among international stakeholders, space situational awareness is modeled as a system of systems with technical and social elements. Through the use of game-theoretic cooperation archetypes and System Dynamics modeling, possible futures are explored. Extensions in space situational awareness capabilities are modeled as mechanisms to improve satellite survivability. Finally, general implications for system architecture and systems of systems are elucidated.

Classical risk-based or game-theoretic security models rely on assumptions from reliability theory and rational expectations economics that are not applicable to security threats. Additionally, these models suffer from serious deficiencies when they are applied to software-intensive, socio-technical systems. A new approach is proposed in this paper that applies principles from control theory to enforce constraints on security threats thereby extending techniques used in system safety engineering. It is applied to identify and mitigate the threats that could emerge in critical infrastructures such as the air transportation system. Insights are provided to assist systems engineers and policy makers in securely transitioning to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS).