A Theory of Disappointment Aversion

Gül, Faruk

doi:10.2307/2938223

Cited by 1,170 publications

(767 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Ex ante, an individual anticipates future disappointment or elation and attempts to minimize ex post disappointment (e.g. Gul, 1991). Formally, the utility of a risky lottery …”

Section: Disappointment Aversion Theory (Dat)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Models of stochastic choice and decision theories: why both are important for analyzing decisions

Blavatskyy

Pogrebna

2009

J of Applied Econometrics

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We select a menu of seven popular decision theories and embed each theory in five models of stochastic choice, including tremble, Fechner and random utility model. We find that the estimated parameters of decision theories differ significantly when theories are combined with different models. Depending on the selected model of stochastic choice we obtain different rankings of decision theories with regard to their goodness of fit to the data. The fit of all analyzed decision theories improves significantly when they are embedded in a Fechner model of heteroscedastic truncated errors or a random utility model. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…Ex ante, an individual anticipates future disappointment or elation and attempts to minimize ex post disappointment (e.g. Gul, 1991). Formally, the utility of a risky lottery …”

Section: Disappointment Aversion Theory (Dat)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Models of stochastic choice and decision theories: why both are important for analyzing decisions

Blavatskyy

Pogrebna

2009

J of Applied Econometrics

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“…Epstein and Zin (1991) exarnine a vaziety of preferences that exhibit first-order risk aversion, inctuding Gul's (1991) accommodate the Allais paradox within a pazsimonious extension of expected utility. Camerar (1989s uggesu that expected utility cannot explain the experimental evidence on preference orderings under uncertainty.…”

Section: The Preference Strudurementioning

confidence: 99%

The implications of first-order risk aversion for asset market risk premiums

Bekaert

Hodrick

Marshall

1997

Journal of Monetary Economics

145

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“…These emotions are more utilitarian, that is, they are more related to the hedonic value of decision outcomes or events. This presumably is why disappointment and (in particular) regret have attracted so much attention in research on individual decision-making (see e.g., Beattie et al, 1994;Bell, 1982Bell, , 1985Gull, 1991;Kelsey, á Schepanski, I991;Inman, Dyer, 8c Regrer und disuppoimnrenr 3 Jia, 1997;Inman, á McAlister, 1994;Janis á Mann, 1977;Josephs, Larrick, Steele, á Nisbett, 1992;Larrick, 8r. Boles, 1995;Loomes 8c Sugden, 1982, 1986, 1987Mellers, Schwartz, Ho,~Ritov, 1997;Richard, van der Plig[, á de Vries, 1996;Ritov, 1996;Ritov, 8c Baron, 1995;Taylor, 1997;van Dijk, 8c van der Pligt, 1997;Zeelenberg et al, I996;Zeelenberg, 8c Beattie, 1997;Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, óc Manstead, nt press).…”

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confidence: 99%

Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment

Zeelenberg

Dijk

Pligt

et al. 1998

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

303

199

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Emotional reactions to the outcomes of decisionsZeelenberg, Marcel; van Dijk, W.W.; van der Pligt, J.; Manstead, A.S.R.; van Empelen, P.; Reinderman, D. Publication date: 1998Link to publication Citation for published version (APA):Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., van der Pligt, J., Manstead, A. S. R., van Empelen, P., & Reinderman, D. (1998). Emotional reactions to the outcomes of decisions: The role of counterfactual thought in the experience of regret and disappointment. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1998-35). Tilburg: Marketing. General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. words, its utility. Thus, when buying a new VCR, the satisfaction or utility derived from that particular VCR depends not only on the attributes of VCR itself, but also on how it compares to the prior set expectations and the attributes of unchosen alternatives. This psychological process of comparing the obtained outcome with other possible outcomes has become known as counterfac[ual thinking.In the present paper we focus on how these counterfactual thoughts about "what might have been"influence specific emotional reactions to decision outcomes. We argue that the content of the counterfactual thoughts (i.e., the specific alternative outcome to which the obtained outcome is compared) has an impact on which emotion is experienced. Studying how these psychological processes cause these specific emotional reactions is not only interesting for its own sake. As shown by recent empirical research, people anticipate emotions, and take them into account when making decisions (e.g., Beattie, Baron, Hershey, Bc Spranca, 1994; Larrick 8c Boles, 1995; Ritov, 1996; Zeelenberg 8c Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt 8c de Vries, 1996). Knowledge about the role of counterfactual thought in the experience of emotions can therefore help us understand the role of emotions in decision-making.Pepijn van Empelen is currently at the Department of Health Education of the University of Maastricht. Dimitri Reinderman recently became a grand master, and decided to leave academia in order to devote his life to the game of chess. We thank lanet Landman and Nyla Branscombe, and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.Address correspondence and reprint requests to Marcel Z...

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A Theory of Disappointment Aversion

Cited by 1,170 publications

References 6 publications

Models of stochastic choice and decision theories: why both are important for analyzing decisions

Models of stochastic choice and decision theories: why both are important for analyzing decisions

The implications of first-order risk aversion for asset market risk premiums

Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment

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