2015
DOI: 10.1214/13-aap986
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A zero-sum game between a singular stochastic controller and a discretionary stopper

Abstract: We consider a stochastic differential equation that is controlled by means of an additive finite-variation process. A singular stochastic controller, who is a minimizer, determines this finite-variation process, while a discretionary stopper, who is a maximizer, chooses a stopping time at which the game terminates. We consider two closely related games that are differentiated by whether the controller or the stopper has a first-move advantage. The games' performance indices involve a running payoff as well as … Show more

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Cited by 25 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…Finally, we derive explicit descriptions of Pareto-optimal policies when N = 2. This complements the existing literature on Nash equilibrium for stochastic two player games (De Angelis & Ferrari, 2018;Dianetti & Ferrari, 2020;Hernandez-Hernandez et al, 2015;Kwon & Zhang, 2015). Analytical comparison between the Pareto-optimal and the Nash equilibrium solutions demonstrates the role of regulator in the interbank lending game.…”
Section: A Class Of Stochastic Differential Games Of Singular Controlsupporting
confidence: 63%
“…Finally, we derive explicit descriptions of Pareto-optimal policies when N = 2. This complements the existing literature on Nash equilibrium for stochastic two player games (De Angelis & Ferrari, 2018;Dianetti & Ferrari, 2020;Hernandez-Hernandez et al, 2015;Kwon & Zhang, 2015). Analytical comparison between the Pareto-optimal and the Nash equilibrium solutions demonstrates the role of regulator in the interbank lending game.…”
Section: A Class Of Stochastic Differential Games Of Singular Controlsupporting
confidence: 63%
“…The game between a controller and a stopper has been studied by Hernández-Hernández et al [26] for the case driven by a diffusion process, where they obtained general results on the verification lemma and gave some explicitly solvable examples.…”
Section: 4mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The paper showed the value of the game as a random process. Hernandez-Hernandez et al (2015) have studied Stochastic Differential Equation. The game is between controller called minimizer and stopper called maximizer.…”
Section: Games In Social Systemsmentioning
confidence: 99%