Access Economy for Storage in Energy Communities

Vespermann, Niklas; Hamacher, Thomas; Kazempour, Jalal

doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2020.3033999

Cited by 43 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…These costs are however overlooked in this study. This assumption is in line with the literature where no cost has been considered for EC formation [9]- [14].…”

Section: A Value Function In Energy Communitysupporting

confidence: 78%

“…In [11], it has been shown that even simple energy consumers can gain cost savings from joining ECs. In [12]- [14], it has been shown that sharing costs and revenues of a common storage in an EC reduces the cost volatility for most prosumers, while the expected operational cost of the community remains unchanged. In [15], interactions among interconnected and autonomous microgrids have been modeled.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities

et al. 2021

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This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the game is super-additive, and the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff. It is also proved that the model is balanced and thus, it has a nonempty core. This means there always exists at least one value sharing mechanism that makes the grand coalition stable. Therefore, prosumers will always achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample is presented to demonstrate that the game is not convex and value sharing based on Shapley values does not necessarily ensure the stability of the coalition. To find a stabilizing value sharing mechanism that belongs to the core of the game, the worst-case excess minimization concept is applied. In this concept, however, size of the optimization problem increases exponentially with respect to the number of members in EC. To make the problem computationally tractable, the idea of clustering members based on their generation/load profiles and considering the same profile and share for members in the same cluster is proposed here. K-means algorithm is used for clustering prosumers' profiles. This way, the problem would have several redundant constraints that can be removed. The redundant constraints are identified and removed via the generalized Llewellyn's rules. Finally, value sharing in an apartment building in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan area is studied to demonstrate effectiveness of the method.

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“…These costs are however overlooked in this study. This assumption is in line with the literature where no cost has been considered for EC formation [9]- [14].…”

Section: A Value Function In Energy Communitysupporting

confidence: 78%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities

et al. 2021

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“…On the other hand, the Myerson Value approach applies to partially connected grids [31], which is not the case for typical ECs. Nucleolus and Core concepts lead to efficient and rational profit allocation, but concerns about fairness and uniqueness arise; conversely, the Shapley Value is widely recognized as a fair measure, but rationality is not guaranteed [50].…”

Section: Literature Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to the EU directives (RED-II and IEMD) [27], ECs shall be no-profit entities that incentive the participation into energy matters and promote the use of renewable energy with environmental benefits [10]. Accordingly, most of the literature considers the community manager to be any member of the EC whose objective is the maximisation of the social welfare of the community itself [24,50,29]. However, most members would not have the skills for properly sizing and coordinating the system.…”

Section: Literature Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, the membership contracts between each user and the EC shall have specific clauses, which we refer to as "exit" in our development, to address these concerns; this can have implications in terms of optimal design. We believe that this matter shall be properly taken into account, while the literature [46,37,47] tends to overlook this hurdle and mainly focuses on the optimal operations of the system [40,9], and sometimes its optimal design [24,50,29].…”

Section: Literature Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal sizing of energy communities with fair revenue sharing and exit clauses: Value, role and business model of aggregators and users

2021

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Energy communities (ECs) are essential policy tools to meet the Energy Transition goals, as they can promote renewable energy sources, demand side management, demand response and citizen participation in energy matters. However, to fully unleash their potential, their design and scheduling requires a coordinated technical operation that the community itself may be ill-equipped to manage, in particular in view of the mutual technical and legal constraints ensuing from a coordinated design. Aggregators and Energy Service COmpanies (ESCOs) can perform this support role, but only provided that their goals are aligned to those of the community, not to incur in the agency problem.In this study, we propose a business model for aggregators of ECs, and its corresponding technical optimization problem, taking into account all crucial aspects: i) alleviating the risk of the agency problem, ii) fairly distributing the reward awarded to the EC, iii) estimating the fair payment for the aggregator services, and iv) defining appropriate exit clauses that rule what happens when a user leaves the EC. A detailed mathematical model is derived and discussed, employing several fair and theoretically-consistent reward distribution schemes, some of which are, to the best of our knowledge, proposed here for the first time. A case study is developed to quantify the value of the aggregator and compare the coordinated solution provided by the aggregator with non-coordinated configurations, numerically illustrating the impact of the reward distribution schemes.The results show that, in the case study, the aggregator enables reducing costs by 16% with respect to a baseline solution, and enables reaching 52.5% renewable share and about 46% self/shared consumption, whereas these same numbers are only 28-35% for the non-coordinated case. Our results suggest that the aggregator fair retribution is around 16-24% the added benefit produced with respect to the noncoordinated solution, and that stable reward distribution schemes such as Shapley/Core or Nucleolus are

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