Accountability and Blame Avoidance After Crises

Kuipers, Sanneke; Brändström, Annika

doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1498

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…The inevitable blame game will undermine the crisis management capacities of politicians that bear responsibility for the origins of the crisis (cf. Boin, Brown, & Richardson, 2019;Kuipers & Brandstrom, 2019).…”

Section: How To Manage Creeping Crises?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hiding in Plain Sight: Conceptualizing the Creeping Crisis

Boin¹,

Ekengren²,

Rhinard³

2020

Risk Hazard & Crisis Pub Pol

204

175

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The COVID-19 crisis is a stark reminder that modern society is vulnerable to a special species of trouble: the creeping crisis. The creeping crisis poses a deep challenge to both academics and practitioners. In the crisis literature, it remains ill-defined and understudied. It is even harder to manage. As a threat, it carries a potential for societal disruption-but that potential is not fully understood. An accumulation of these creeping crises can erode public trust in institutions. This paper proposes a definition of a creeping crisis, formulates research questions, and identifies the most relevant theoretical approaches. It provides the building blocks for the systematic study of creeping crises.

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Section: How To Manage Creeping Crises?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hiding in Plain Sight: Conceptualizing the Creeping Crisis

Boin¹,

Ekengren²,

Rhinard³

2020

Risk Hazard & Crisis Pub Pol

204

175

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“…Officeholders are increasingly held to account by actors who solely have an informal role in blame games, such as the media and interest groups (Kuipers & Brändström, 2020). According to Djerf-Pierre and others (2014, p. 325), "the watchdog function of the media is fundamental in a democracy," while Bovens concluded that the media are fast gaining power as informal accountholders (2007, p. 455).…”

Section: Informal Institutional Actors: Authoritative Actors and The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Avoiding Blame in Policy Crises in Different Institutional Settings

Ruiter¹,

Kuipers²

2022

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics

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Policy crises often lead to “framing contests,” in which officeholders, opponents, media, and the public at large aim to interpret the crisis in question, explain its cause, attribute responsibility, and agree on ways to address harm caused. More often than not, these contests turn into blame games for the incumbent officeholder. Formal and informal institutional factors can shape blame avoidance options of officeholders, and influence the outcomes of these crisis-induced blame games in terms of blame escalation, policy responses, and political sanctions. First, formal institutions shape officeholders’ incentives for arguing that they are not responsible for the crisis or should not be punished for its occurrence. Studies in the field of welfare state retrenchment and ministerial resignations have analyzed the blame avoidance options of governments and the survival rates of officeholders in various institutional settings. These studies have provided evidence that institutional complexity and policy-making authority help explaining pathways of blame management. In single-party governments, the accountability chain is more clear and prime ministers have a stronger electoral incentive to sack failing and unpopular ministers. However, a more restrictive interpretation of formal ministerial responsibility for administrative or implementation failures, along with the delegation of policy execution to agencies at arm’s length, can work as a protective shield in blame games for the officeholders and reinforce policy inertia. Consociational systems with multiparty coalitions often show an opposite effect. Second, institutionalized norms, also known as “the way we do things around here,” affect blame avoidance behavior available to officeholders. Studies which have taken “cultural-institutional” approaches to accountability studies have shown that informal accountability actors, fora, and norms about appropriate behavior shape blame processes. Actors in consociational systems with multiparty coalitions often consider consensus-oriented and nonconfrontational behavior, such as attempts to appease the opposition with policy reparations, as more appropriate responses to blame than those in systems with more elite polarization. In addition, officeholders are increasingly held to account by actors who solely have an informal role in blame games, such as the media and interest groups. Therefore, the extent of mediatization and increased polarization plays a major role in how different political contexts “process” blame. Third, other relevant noninstitutional factors for blame avoidance behavior are important, such as the nature and timing of the crisis and involvement of other actors in the blame game. Issue salience and proximity affect the potential for blame escalations and the options for blame management by both office holders and their opponents. Prior reputation of incumbent politicians helps them to draw on leadership capital to deflect blame. If the timing of a blame game coincides with upcoming elections, blame is more likely to escalate and lead to political sanctions. To further understanding of the role of institutional factors in crisis-induced blames games, future research should focus on blame games where institutions themselves are questioned, contested, or in-flux.

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“…The second contest involves blame attribution dynamicsefforts to avoid culpability and manoeuvrings to allocate responsibility (Hood, 2002;Kuipers and Brändström, 2020). This contest may not only make or break the viability of implemented policies, but also the political fortunes of incumbent leaders ('t Hart and Tindall, 2009, 28).…”

Section: Crisis Management Securitization Theory and Pandemic Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What drives support for social distancing? Pandemic politics, securitization, and crisis management in Britain

Karyotis

Connolly

Collignon

et al. 2021

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Support for social distancing measures was, globally, high at the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic but increasingly came under pressure. Focusing on the UK, this article provides a rigorous exploration of the drivers of public support for social distancing at their formative stage, via mixed methods. Synthesizing insights from crisis management and securitization theory, thematic analysis is employed to map the main frames promoted by the government and other actors on the nature/severity, blame/responsibility, and appropriate response to the pandemic, which ‘follows the science’. The impact of these on public attitudes is examined via a series of regression analyses, drawing on a representative survey of the UK population (n = 2100). Findings challenge the prevailing understanding that support for measures is driven by personal health considerations, socio-economic circumstances, and political influences. Instead, crisis framing dynamics, which the government is well-positioned to dominate, have the greatest impact on driving public attitudes.

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Accountability and Blame Avoidance After Crises

Cited by 6 publications

References 67 publications

Hiding in Plain Sight: Conceptualizing the Creeping Crisis

Hiding in Plain Sight: Conceptualizing the Creeping Crisis

Avoiding Blame in Policy Crises in Different Institutional Settings

What drives support for social distancing? Pandemic politics, securitization, and crisis management in Britain

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