We study the general equilibrium of the housing market in an economy populated by overlapping generations of households. A contribution of the present paper is to solve for the housing market equilibrium in the presence of aggregate (interest rate) uncertainty with a realistic mortgage contract. In addition, households also face idiosyncratic uncertainty resulting from stochastic changes over the lifecycle in tastes (or need) for housing. In this environment, pro…t maximizing banks o¤er …xed-rate mortgage (FRM) contracts to home buyers. As seems plausible, each housing market transaction is subject to a …xed cost, which gives rise to S-s policy rules for housing transactions: existing home owners change the size of their houses only if there is a su¢ ciently large change in the state of the economy (i.e., in interest rates, in their taste for housing, etc.) A plausibly calibrated version of the model is consistent with three empirically documented features of the housing market: (i) highly volatile housing prices and transaction volume, (ii) a strong positive correlation between transaction volume and housing prices, and (iii) a signi…cant negative relationship between interest rates and housing prices, which can rationalize a large part of the recent boom in housing prices in the U.S. and around the world.