Accuracy Enhancement of Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on Computer Monitors

Sayakkara, Asanka; Le-Khac, Nhien-An; Scanlon, Mark

doi:10.1145/3230833.3234690

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…However, decades later, this threat still isn't well-documented and understood by the research (scientific) community. Today's VDUs are still very much affected by this eavesdropping risk as shown in the following works [4]- [8], [10]- [15]. These confirmed that VDUs in general and video data signaling cables such as VGA (video graphics array), DVI (digital visual interface), HDMI (high-definition multimedia interface) and LVDS (low-voltage differential signaling) suffer from compromising emanations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 68%

Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions

Meulemeester

Scheers

Vandenbosch

2020

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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Video display units (VDUs) using differential signaling technology significantly increase the risk of compromising video information security through leakage emissions. This paper shows that differential signaling cables act as substantial video leakage sources. A concept is proposed which explains the video leakage principles of VDUs using differential signal cables such as the HDMI (high-definition multimedia interface) cable, DVI (digital visual interface) cable and the LVDS (low-voltage differential signaling) cable. The emanations of the LVDS cable are closely examined by measuring simultaneously the differential video signal on the LVDS lines and its near-and far-field leakage emissions. From these measurements several conclusions are drawn which give new insights into the video eavesdropping risk of VDUs using differential signaling methods. Furthermore, a novel video image reconstruction method is proposed which exploits the compromising emanations of a video display unit (VDU) by using frequency demodulation techniques. This paper shows that leaked video emanations of VDUs using differential signaling cables are not only amplitude modulated (AM) but also frequency modulated (FM). This strongly implies that the possible algorithmic toolset of malicious video eavesdroppers is much larger than currently assumed. This paper investigates several VDU setups at a distance of 10 meters, including an ultra-high-definition video display, three different HDMI cables and two notebooks. Additionally, the AM-based and FM-based video image reconstruction results are discussed and compared.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 68%

Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions

Meulemeester

Scheers

Vandenbosch

2020

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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“…There can be some operations of the CPU that are more clearly reflected in the device's power consumption than in the EM emission and vice versa. Similarly, malware running on a victim computer can aid an EM side-channel attacker to extract additional information (over the EM side-channel alone) by intentionally modulating data into the EM emission of the CPU or the monitor [105,106,94].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) is a technique that can be used to assess the resistance of cryptographic implementations against hardware sidechannel attacks [92]. TempestSDR is a software tool that can be used with a large variety of hardware platforms, e.g., the universal software radio peripheral 1 (USRP) or HackRF 2 , to eavesdrop on computer monitors by capturing the EM signals emitted by the video cables [93,94].…”

Section: Standards and Toolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey of electromagnetic side-channel attacks and discussion on their case-progressing potential for digital forensics

Sayakkara

Le-Khac

Scanlon

2019

Digital Investigation

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The increasing prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has made it inevitable that their pertinence to digital forensic investigations will increase into the foreseeable future. These devices produced by various vendors often posses limited standard interfaces for communication, such as USB ports or WiFi/Bluetooth wireless interfaces. Meanwhile, with an increasing mainstream focus on the security and privacy of user data, built-in encryption is becoming commonplace in consumer-level computing devices, and IoT devices are no exception. Under these circumstances, a significant challenge is presented to digital forensic investigations where data from IoT devices needs to be analysed.This work explores the electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis literature for the purpose of assisting digital forensic investigations on IoT devices. EM side-channel analysis is a technique where unintentional electromagnetic emissions are used for eavesdropping on the operations and data handling of computing devices. The non-intrusive nature of EM side-channel approaches makes it a viable option to assist digital forensic investigations as these attacks require, and must result in, no modification to the target device. The literature on various EM side-channel analysis attack techniques are discussed -selected on the basis of their applicability in IoT device investigation scenarios. The insight gained from the background study is used to identify promising future applications of the technique for digital forensic analysis on IoT devices -potentially progressing a wide variety of currently hindered digital investigations.

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“…A more affordable choice is to use Software-Defined Radio (SDR) to intercept the signal [64][62] [63]. A bandwidth of 20 to 50 MHz is required to achieve the best video quality [57] but a lower-quality alternative is possible with a tunable TV receiver [65] which is in fact a small SDR with low bandwidth (around 2 MHz).…”

Section: A Radio Frequency Radiation Side-channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Whispering Devices: A Survey on How Side-channels Lead to Compromised Information

et al. 2021

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While operating, information processing devices or communication systems may emit unwanted signals (or alter existing ones) through electromagnetic waves, light, sound or power drain. These side-channels can be intercepted by anyone with scientific or technical knowledge and appropriate equipment, leading to a potentially high risk of security breaches. This survey focuses on these emanation side-channels and provides an extensive literature review. To provide an in-depth analysis despite the variety of attacks, we propose to classify the sidechannels based on their criticality, their intentionality, the type of attackers, and the physical medium. Illustrative use-cases are presented and serve as a basis to infer individual threats. Particular attention is paid to electromagnetic side-channels which exhibit the highest criticality and have therefore been used in the most recent attacks. The main characteristics of the sidechannels revealed by state-of-the-art papers are summarized and recommendations on countermeasures are provided to protect any sensitive equipment.

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Accuracy Enhancement of Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on Computer Monitors

Cited by 12 publications

References 7 publications

Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions

Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions

A survey of electromagnetic side-channel attacks and discussion on their case-progressing potential for digital forensics

Whispering Devices: A Survey on How Side-channels Lead to Compromised Information

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