2016 ACM/IEEE 7th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS) 2016
DOI: 10.1109/iccps.2016.7479068
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Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Additive Manufacturing Systems

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Cited by 101 publications
(61 citation statements)
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“…A recent study [12] is in coherence with our observation from a different angle. Zoom H6 Acoustic Recorder [10] was employed to collect the subtle difference of the vibration (frame energy) conducted from the motor to the nozzle when the nozzle moved in two directions in one axis.…”
Section: Exploring Acoustic Side Chan-nelsupporting
confidence: 94%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…A recent study [12] is in coherence with our observation from a different angle. Zoom H6 Acoustic Recorder [10] was employed to collect the subtle difference of the vibration (frame energy) conducted from the motor to the nozzle when the nozzle moved in two directions in one axis.…”
Section: Exploring Acoustic Side Chan-nelsupporting
confidence: 94%
“…They presented a side-channel attack method to recover what a dot matrix 2D printer is printing based on the sound record. Al Faruque et al [12] demonstrated the acoustic side-channel attack on 3D printing. However, they only considered the cases with single contour instead of multiple ones.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…From an attack perspective, Faruque, et al, [10] present the first side-channel attack on a 3D printer. The authors show how acoustic emanations of a desktop 3D printer can be used to reconstruct the printed object's geometry.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This openness creates a threat to the confidentiality of the system mostly toward the intellectual property theft. Researchers have shown that the digital design of a 3D-printed model can be regenerated from acoustic side channel attacks [83] leading to intellectual property theft of a company.…”
Section: Industrial Processingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, various attack models have been proposed to take advantage of physical structure of CPS. For instance, authors in [82][83][84][85][86] have demonstrated how to utilize acoustic, vibration, electromagnetic, thermal, etc. analog emissions from the 3D printer to reconstruct and steal the geometrical design information of the product.…”
Section: Prototypingmentioning
confidence: 99%