2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.exis.2020.06.019
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Activists and regulatory politics: Institutional opportunities, information, and the activation of environmental regulation

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Cited by 12 publications
(16 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
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“…According to Arce et al 112 , people who perceive their government has the capacity to respond to their claims are ready to protest; conversely, those who observe the incapacity to establish long-term changes doubt the effectiveness of exercising this right. Hence the importance of exchanging information between the civil society and the regulating state in the dynamics of a socioenvironmental conflict, due to the unequal conditions to access institutional mechanisms, to look for allies and to model strategies to obtain results 113 .…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Arce et al 112 , people who perceive their government has the capacity to respond to their claims are ready to protest; conversely, those who observe the incapacity to establish long-term changes doubt the effectiveness of exercising this right. Hence the importance of exchanging information between the civil society and the regulating state in the dynamics of a socioenvironmental conflict, due to the unequal conditions to access institutional mechanisms, to look for allies and to model strategies to obtain results 113 .…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The agent group, either NGOs or largeholders, achieving a government response resets its pressure contingent to its baseline while the agent group whose pressure was not responded to sets its pressure contingent to half of its current value. This mechanism reflects the recognition by agents that the government has limited capacity to respond to pressure while maintaining a raised pressure contingent from the losing side (Haslam & Godfrid 2020;Jänicke 1992). Interactions among the government and largeholders and/or smallholders are tracked.…”
Section: 19mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As in other historically poor provinces of the Northwest, authorities cultivated clientelist relationships with society based on the provision of public employment (Gervasoni 2010; Svampa et al 2010, 157–60; Rodriguez Pardo 2011, 47–48). San Juan authorities were probably more interventionist than those in Chile, retaining considerable discretion to informally pressure private mining companies on local procurement, employment, and social responsibility spending (Haslam and Godfrid 2020).…”
Section: The Pascua Lama/veladero Projectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Figure 1 also shows an increase in social mobilization around 2010 related to the federal Glacier Law as activists seized on its potential to cancel the project, and by 2011, antimining protests had emerged across the country, including neighboring provinces (Wagner 2016). Social movements in San Juan federalized their opposition to Pascua Lama by framing their conflict with Barrick as a dispute over glaciers and by networking with other like-minded organizations nationally to demand the implementation of the federal law, in the streets and the courts (Haslam and Godfrid 2020).…”
Section: Argentinamentioning
confidence: 99%