2005
DOI: 10.1162/0163660054798735
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Afghanistan: When counternarcotics undermines counterterrorism

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Cited by 24 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…With the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the continued criminalisation of the crop forced producers to look for protection beyond the state – and, as Goodhand notes, there was no shortage of non‐state ‘specialists in violence’– which is how local militia leaders (‘warlords’) were drawn deeper into the trade. This war economy has since mutated into what Goodhand calls a criminalised peace economy, where a highly flexible ‘pyramid of protection and patronage’ provides ‘state protection to criminal trafficking’, which has in turn allowed these ‘military and political entrepreneurs’ to capture large parts of the state (Goodhand 2008; see also Farrell and Thorne 2005; Felbab‐Brown 2005). This is a bare bones summary of an evolving situation, but even in this skeletal form it should be clear that the legal status of the poppy trade cannot be treated as an invariant, given that its most rapid expansion coincided with two periods of state‐building under the Taliban and the Karzai regime, and that the relationship between poppy producers, traffickers and state officials has thus been a constantly changing and not unremittingly hostile one 14…”
Section: Conceptualising Late Modern Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the continued criminalisation of the crop forced producers to look for protection beyond the state – and, as Goodhand notes, there was no shortage of non‐state ‘specialists in violence’– which is how local militia leaders (‘warlords’) were drawn deeper into the trade. This war economy has since mutated into what Goodhand calls a criminalised peace economy, where a highly flexible ‘pyramid of protection and patronage’ provides ‘state protection to criminal trafficking’, which has in turn allowed these ‘military and political entrepreneurs’ to capture large parts of the state (Goodhand 2008; see also Farrell and Thorne 2005; Felbab‐Brown 2005). This is a bare bones summary of an evolving situation, but even in this skeletal form it should be clear that the legal status of the poppy trade cannot be treated as an invariant, given that its most rapid expansion coincided with two periods of state‐building under the Taliban and the Karzai regime, and that the relationship between poppy producers, traffickers and state officials has thus been a constantly changing and not unremittingly hostile one 14…”
Section: Conceptualising Late Modern Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A lightly armed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remained confined to Kabul and its immediate environs in the critical months following the fall of the Taliban, when an international peacekeeping presence in the countryside might have had an important signalling effect on both warlords and the wider population. 5 Continued Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US military funding of regional warlords to act as militia proxies against the Taliban and turning a blind eye to the reinvigorated drug economy in 2002, so as not to compromise relationships with regional power holders (Hodes and Sedra, 2007;FelbabBrown, 2005), reinforced the decentralised political structures that had emerged during the war years. These decisions left a significant legacy by narrowing the intervention options for effective statebuilding in the years that followed and creating the foundation for the steady growth of the security crisis that prevailed in 2009.…”
Section: International Intervention and 'Post-conflict' Peacebuildingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While traditional practices of poppy cultivation and processing in Afghanistan are highly inefficient in contrast to those in Australia, they underpin rural livelihoods there. For the growing seasons between 2002/03 and 2005/06, the value of opium exported each year has ranged from over 60% down to 38% of Afghanistan's gross domestic product: (Felbab‐Brown, ; Goodhand, ).…”
Section: Discussion: How Law and Space Can Make Worlds Of Differencementioning
confidence: 99%