1992
DOI: 10.1080/09515089208573068
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Against eliminative materialism: From folk psychology to Völkersychologie

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Cited by 9 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Thus if our folk psychological explanations of human behavior are hopelessly inaccurate and inadequate, as Churchland (1981) claims, then we ought perhaps to abandon our familiar ontology of contentful psychological states, and any theoretical account of singular personhood that makes reference to it. I accept this conditional, but reject its antecendent (see Greenwood, 1992).…”
Section: Cognitive Accessmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Thus if our folk psychological explanations of human behavior are hopelessly inaccurate and inadequate, as Churchland (1981) claims, then we ought perhaps to abandon our familiar ontology of contentful psychological states, and any theoretical account of singular personhood that makes reference to it. I accept this conditional, but reject its antecendent (see Greenwood, 1992).…”
Section: Cognitive Accessmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Selon cette vision, les personnes n'agissent pas sur la base de leurs croyances, buts, aspirations ou attentes, mais c'est plutôt la mise en route de leur réseau neural au niveau subpersonnel qui les incite à agir. Dans sa critique de l'éliminativisme, Greenwood (1992) affirme que les cognitions sont des facteurs psychologiques pourvus de contenus sémantiques dont le sens ne dépend en rien des propositions explicatives dans lesquelles elles figurent. Le phlogistique n'avait ni fondement empirique ni valeur explicative ou prédictive.…”
Section: Les Changements De Paradigme Dans Les Théories Psychologiquesunclassified