Against Political Compromise

Ruser, Alexander; Machin, Amanda

doi:10.4324/9781315105024

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The last objection we have singled out was also formulated by Ruser and Machin (2017). Although Bellamy (1999) estimated that real-world compromise shows "a decent respect for pluralism" (p. 93), Ruser and Machin (2017) assumed that compromise-at least, if concluded "too quickly, or too easily"-jeopardizes pluralism (pp.…”

Section: The Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Risk of jeopardizing fundamental moral values (Hallowell, 1944) Inconsistency in the application of principles (Dworkin, 1986) Risk of obfuscating the inherently conflictual nature of politics (Adler, 1927;Mouffe, 1998;) At the expense of outsiders or disadvantaged groups (Cheneval & el-Wakil, 2018;Kirshner, 2018;Ruser & Machin, 2017) At the expense of dissenting voices (Ruser & Machin, 2017)…”

Section: Pluralitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The third objection, based on the irreducibility of conflicts (Mouffe, 1998), manifests hostility to an understanding of politics that implies balancing interests and fostering moderation through the forging of compromises. The last two objections have appeared more recently and are (albeit differently) concerned with domination: the outcome of a compromise may disadvantage less‐privileged groups because of the unequal power resources of the compromising parties (Ruser & Machin, 2017, pp. 12−28), or it may silence dissenting voices, and thus, reduce the diversity of political debate (Ruser & Machin, 2017, pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The last two objections have appeared more recently and are (albeit differently) concerned with domination: the outcome of a compromise may disadvantage less‐privileged groups because of the unequal power resources of the compromising parties (Ruser & Machin, 2017, pp. 12−28), or it may silence dissenting voices, and thus, reduce the diversity of political debate (Ruser & Machin, 2017, pp. 29−47).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Against compromise in democracy? A plea for a fine‐grained assessment

Baume

Papadopoulos

2022

Constellations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Disdain for compromise between political forces within democratic regimes is widespread 1 and, as we will show, polymorphic. This paper provides a systematic mapping of objections 2 to compromises developed within the field of contemporary political theory 3 and evaluates different kinds of rebuttals to these objections. We dedicate considerable space to the discussion of the normative, as well as the empirical, validity of these counterarguments. By reviewing objections and rebuttals in an organized, succinct, and at the same time, comprehensive way, we wish to arbitrate carefully between them. 4 Typological work that builds inventories of objections and proceeds to the evaluation of such objections is not unprecedented in political theory. 5 Our typological approach sheds light on the ambivalence surrounding the notion of compromise, a conundrum that in the absence of a systematic exploration of its sources has puzzled many political

show abstract

Section: The Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Pluralitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Against compromise in democracy? A plea for a fine‐grained assessment

Baume

Papadopoulos

2022

Constellations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As such, it does not delegitimize the democratic system but can provide an understanding of its meaning and value to citizens. However, it might be objected that Compromise entails an uncritical understanding of democracy and discourages expressions of dissent (Ruser and Machin, 2017). 2…”

Section: Making Disagreement Visiblementioning

confidence: 99%

Second-Order Political Thinking: Compromise versus Populism

Rostbøll

2020

Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The literature often mentions that populism is in conflict with the politics of compromise. However, the opposition remains vague and undertheorized. This article confronts populism and compromise in a novel way by analyzing them as types of second-order political thinking and ideologies of democracy. Second-order political thinking provides a set of ideas and concepts that frames and regulates how we relate to others in politics, and how we make political decisions for, with, or against them. By contrasting populism and compromise as types of second-order political thinking, we will better be able to understand each and normatively compare them. Thus, we see that (1) compromise is inherently most attractive as second-order political thinking, and (2) populism fails as an ideology of democracy, because it cannot explain the meaning and value of the democratic system as a set of authoritative institutions and procedures.

show abstract

Climates of democracy: Skeptical, rational, and radical imaginaries

Machin

2022

WIREs Climate Change

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How will the theories and practices of democracy fare in a climate changing world? Are conventional democratic institutions ultimately doomed or are they able to become more responsive to a changing climate? Is there a need to reimagine democracy and how might it be reimagined? This article reviews the different responses to these questions by distinguishing between three “political imaginaries” in which the relationship between climate change and democracy takes distinct forms. I start by showing how the concept of “political imaginaries” can facilitate the comparison of the different ways in which the relation between democracy and climate change is constructed, before reviewing three such imaginaries. The skeptical imaginary, found in the “eco‐authoritarianism” of the 1970s that is echoed by much sociopolitical analysis today, casts doubt on the possibilities of democratic mechanisms to respond adequately and swiftly to the problem of climate change. Those who resist such skepticism often defend democracy by arguing that institutions and processes of democracy can be made more “ecologically rational”—the rational imaginary of climate democracy involves improvements in political representation and participation. Finally, I present the alternative radical democratic imaginary, in which the crisis of climate change provides a moment for the rupture of existing sociopolitical structures and the formation of alternatives. The article concludes that although none of these imaginaries is able to capture the entirety of climate change politics around the world, the radical democratic imaginary is responsive to the inevitable and valuable plurality around the issue of climate change. This article is categorized under: Climate, Nature, and Ethics > Ethics and Climate Change Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

show abstract

Against Political Compromise

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Against compromise in democracy? A plea for a fine‐grained assessment

Against compromise in democracy? A plea for a fine‐grained assessment

Second-Order Political Thinking: Compromise versus Populism

Climates of democracy: Skeptical, rational, and radical imaginaries

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About