Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation

Parkhurst, Gregory M.; Shogren, Jason F.; Bastian, Christopher T.; Kivi, Paul; Donner, Jennifer; Smith, Rodney B.W.

doi:10.1016/s0921-8009(02)00036-8

Cited by 287 publications

(172 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…through incentive payments from agri-environment schemes, but these typically neither require nor encourage landscape level coordination. Agglomeration bonuses (Parkhurst et al, 2002;Warziniack et al, 2007) may ensure coordinated management but do not necessarily require land manager cooperation or buy-in for the joint contribution, since applications can be prepared by consultants without the need for individuals to ever meet and talk. In one case study, Drechsler et al (2010) found that agglomeration bonuses led to cost savings of up to 70% compared to homogeneous payments where payment rates were not linked to the way in which habitats were configured across the landscape.…”

Section: Overcoming Challenges To Collaborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes

Moxey²,

et al. 2014

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. 2014. Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes.Contact CEH NORA team at noraceh@ceh.ac.ukThe NERC and CEH trademarks and logos ('the Trademarks') are registered trademarks of NERC in the UK and other countries, and may not be used without the prior written consent of the Trademark owner.Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes in UK peatlands AbstractThis paper considers how agri-environment schemes under the Common Agricultural Policy could be adapted to derive a higher return of ecosystem services from agricultural land, through deliberation with members of the public, land owners, managers and other stakeholders: i) paying for the ecosystem services that are valued most by society; ii) spatially targeting payments to locations where ecosystem services can most efficiently be provided; and iii) providing incentives for cross-boundary collaboration over the provision of ecosystem services that need to be managed at catchment or wider spatial scales. Using UK upland peatlands as a case study, and drawing on experience tackling these issues in the new Glastir agri-environment scheme in Wales, the paper attempts to find a balance between current input-based schemes that pay for land management activities on the basis of income foregone and output-based schemes that pay by results. The paper reviews evidence that spatially targeted, output-based payments may be more economically efficient than current approaches, but identifies a number of challenges, including: scientific uncertainty; pricing of ecosystem services; timing of payments; increased risk to land managers; compliance with World Trade Organisation regulations; and barriers to cross-boundary collaboration in the management of ecosystem services at habitat, catchment or landscape scales. A number of options are reviewed to overcome these challenges, including: the use of process-based models, pressureresponse functions and expert knowledge to establish causal links between management and ecosystem service delivery and reduce the costs of monitoring; the use of competitive bidding or non-market valuation techniques to set prices for ecosystem service delivery; insurance schemes; combining agri-environment schemes with funding from private Payment for Ecosystem Service schemes; and independent facilitation of groups of potential applicants across property boundaries in scheme options that are co-designed with the land management community. Drawing on examples from UK peatlands and experience designing the Glastir scheme, the paper 2 proposes a number of ways in which agri-environment schemes around the world that make payments on the basis of management inputs can better link payments to the provision of ecosystem services.

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Section: Overcoming Challenges To Collaborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes

Moxey²,

et al. 2014

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“…The model allows for all sorts of connectivity assumptions, but in the simulations in the following sections we assume queen contiguity, that is, we allow for both horizontal and diagonal connections (cf. Parkhurst et al 2002, Drechsler et al 2010, Iftekhar and Tisdell 2014.…”

Section: A Corridor Auction Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, ecological efficiency might not be reached when procurement from the lowest bidders delivers a fragmented outcome and crucial pathways to connect different habitat patches are not formed (Margules and Pressey 2000, Williams and Snyder 2005, Conrad et al 2012. 1 Mechanisms in which the payment received for conserving a plot depends on the number of retired neighboring plots (so-called agglomeration bonuses) can help reduce this potential fragmentation problem (Parkhurst et al 2002, Parkhurst and Shogren 2007, Wätzold and Drechsler 2005, Drechsler et al 2010. 2 Experimental studies on the effectiveness and efficiency of agglomeration bonuses typically use fixed corridor values and opportunity costs, and they also impose that participation is mandatory (cf.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Buyouts and Agglomeration Bonuses in Wildlife Corridor Auctions

Dijk¹,

Ansink²,

Soest

2017

SSRN Journal

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We present a general model of bidding behavior in wildlife corridor auctions. Given (i) some spatial configuration of landowners in a landscape, (ii) the landowners' opportunity costs, and (iii) the value of establishing the corridor, our model predicts individual landowners' bids, overall participation rates in the auction, as well as the expected net benefits to the conservation agency. We find that market efficiency of the auction increases in the number of potential corridors. We use simulations to compare a benchmark auction with two policy scenarios in a hypothetical landscape. In one scenario, members of a winning corridor receive an agglomeration bonus. In the other scenario, we buy out a pivotal landowner (one that is part of many potential corridors) prior to the auction. Given equal budgets for the agglomeration bonus and the buyout policy, an agglomeration bonus is less efficient than a buyout for conservation agencies facing low budgets, and vice versa. A risk-averse conservation agency is however always better off using a buyout policy.

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“…We create a system that combines a tradable set-aside requirement (TSARs) with an agglomeration bonus to meet spatial conservation objectives at least cost (see Parkhurst and Crocker, 2002;. A regulator determines the number of land parcels necessary to meet spatial conservation objectives and then allocates set-aside requirements proportionally to the landowners.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Positive incentives take on many forms (e.g., taxes, subsidies; see Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003;Ferraro and Kiss, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tradable Set-Aside Requirements (TSARs): Conserving Spatially Dependent Environmental Amenities

Parkhurst

Shogren

Crocker

2014

Environ Resource Econ

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In the lab, we examine the effectiveness of two land use conservation policies: a tradable set aside requirements (TSARs), and the TSARs combined with an agglomeration bonus. Evaluated by bioeconomic efficiency, our experimental results suggest: 1) TSARs is a cost-effective land conservation tool; and 2) combining TSARS with the agglomeration bonus increases habitat connectivity but at a price-lower economic efficiency. * Thanks to the USDA, and the UW Stroock and Bugas funds for partial financial support. Shogren thanks the Norwegian University of Life Sciences for their support while working on this project. Additional thanks to Travis Warziniack and students at the University of Wyoming for insightful comments and discussions.2

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Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation

Cited by 287 publications

References 26 publications

Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes

Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes

Buyouts and Agglomeration Bonuses in Wildlife Corridor Auctions

Tradable Set-Aside Requirements (TSARs): Conserving Spatially Dependent Environmental Amenities

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