Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals

Abstract

Belief is generally thought to be the primary cognitive state representing the world as being a certain way, regulating our behavior and guiding us around the world. It is thus regarded as being constitutively linked with the truth of its content. This feature of belief has been famously captured in the thesis that believing is a purposive state aiming at truth. It has however proved to be notoriously difficult to explain what the thesis really involves. In this paper, I begin by critically examining a number of recent attempts to unpack the metaphor. I shall then proceed to highlight an error that seems to cripple most of these attempts. This involves the confusion between, what I call, doxastic and epistemic goals. Finally, having offered my own positive account of the aim-of-belief thesis, I shall underline its deflationary nature by distinguishing between aiming at truth and hitting that target (truth). I end by comparing the account with certain prominent inflationary theories of the nature of belief.

Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

“…18 The formulation is based on Alston (1989, p. 201). However, versions of it can be found in many places, including BonJour (1985), Rysiew (2003), Vahid (2006). to the agent, her belief is formed in a way that maximizes her true beliefs and minimizes her false ones.…”

Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?

“…I only use truth as my example in this paper for simplicity and because it is the most popular candidate. See for instance Williams (1973), Railton (1994Railton ( , 1997, Velleman (2000), Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003), Shah (2003), Burge (2003), Millar (2004), Gibbard (2005), Shah and Velleman (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006), Vahid (2006, Whiting (2010), and Littlejohn (2012. Knowledge is the most popular alternative.…”

“…To aim at u-ing or to have the aim of u-ing is to intend to u. Given the personal interpretation of the aim of belief, this would entail that we necessarily intend to believe the truth about whether P whenever we 23 This distinction between the functional or sub-personal interpretation and the personal interpretation is analogous to Vahid's (2006) distinction between doxastic and epistemic goals, i.e. between beliefs aiming at truth and aiming at true beliefs.…”

Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms

“…7 For a defence of the view that claims about the aims of belief should be understood in normative terms, see Shah [2003]. Vahid [2006] seems to think that it is a mistake to try to draw normative conclusions from claims about what is constitutive about belief as a mental state. Vahid might reject the argument for the knowledge account right from the outset, but as I think the argument Wedgwood [2002]; Williams [1973]).…”