“…Frith, 1989;Happé & U. Frith, 2006), is the neurocognitive distinction between the contribution of bottom-up sensory processing to perception (relating most directly to sensory input) and the top-down modulation of input based on endogenous factors such as prior knowledge and attention (C. Frith & Dolan, 1997;Gilbert & Sigman, 2007;Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007). More recent Bayesian accounts develop this point in relation to ASD explicitly: for example, Pellicano and Burr (2012) suggest that prior expectations regarding the state of the world may have diminished influence on perception in ASD, increasing reliance on bottom-up signals (for discussion and related proposals, see Brock, 2012;Friston et al, 2013;Hohwy, in press;Mitchell & Ropar, 2004;Paton et al, 2012;van Boxtel & Lu, 2013). …”